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Abstract
Sale of products with a probabilistic nature, where customers do not know which
product they will receive at the time of service, has become popular over the recent
years. In the revenue management literature, there has been a growing interest in
understanding these modern approaches using analytical techniques. On the other
hand, customer-centric revenue management has been replacing the long-standing
inventory-centric approach because of the availability of rich data sets by focusing on
understanding and predicting customer behavior and then optimizing price and/or
quantity related decisions. In this dissertation, we take a customer-centric approach
and do not only provide analytical results, but also empirically investigate how cus-
tomers make their decisions, which is crucial in order to implement appropriate strate-
gies.
We first focus on an innovative hotel revenue management practice called standby
upgrades, i.e., a practice where the guest is only charged for the discounted upgrade
if it is available at the time of arrival. In particular, Chapter 2 discusses how to
optimally price standby upgrades and evaluates their benefits through an analytical
model. Chapter 3 uses a major hotel chain’s booking and standby upgrades data to
investigate the extent of strategic guest behavior through empirical analysis. Then,
we focus on another innovative revenue management practice, but in the mega event
industry, called team-specific ticket options. Chapter 4 studies fans’ decision-making
process for the 2015 College Football season using a unique data set.
v
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Chapter 1
Overview
1.1 What is Revenue Management?
Every seller of a product or service faces a number of fundamental decisions such as
when to sell and how much to ask. There may be a significant amount of uncertainty
in the demand side, therefore the decision-making is not simple, and can become even
more complex because of the multi-dimensional nature of the demand. The business
must consider the set of products it sells, the types of customers it serves and their
purchasing behaviors, the prices and time to sell.
Revenue management is concerned with such demand-management decisions and
addresses the structural, price, timing and quantity decisions a firm makes to exploit
the potential of this demand landscape (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2006). Therefore,
revenue management can be defined as the wide range of techniques, decisions, meth-
ods, processes, and technologies that predict customer behavior, optimize availability
and price with an objective of increasing revenues. The most practical definition is
quoted by Robert G. Cross, “selling the right product to the right customer at the
right time for the right price” (Cross, 1997).
1.2 Brief History of Revenue Management
In the early 1970s, airlines started to experiment with several discounted fare op-
tions to fill the seats that would otherwise fly empty (McGill and Van Ryzin, 1999).
Because of the demand-shift threat (i.e., high fare passengers who were going to fly re-
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gardless of the price would choose the discounted options), several restrictions for the
discounted fares were created, such as advance-purchase requirement and minimum-
stay conditions (Cross et al., 2009).
Following this initial effort, American Airlines soon realized that demand patterns
were fluctuating by route and time (time-of-day, day-of-week, and season). In 1976,
the company started to use large databases and computer systems to better forecast
and monitor the demand, and to better allocate discount seats. This practice was
called “Yield Management” by Bob Crandall, then Senior Vice President of Marketing
for American (Cross et al., 2011).
With the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, U.S. Civil Aviation Board loosened
control of airline prices. This led to a new era with several low-cost low-fare airlines
like PeoplExpress which could even charge less than established carriers’ discounted
fares. Bob Crandall, then American’s President, accelerated the development of DI-
NAMO (Dynamic Inventory Optimization and Maintenance Optimization) tool to
respond to the threat of low-cost low-fare airlines, and American started a new non-
refundable advanced-purchase discounted fare (with multiple restrictions), which was
even lower than the fares offered by PeoplExpress. This system increased American’s
revenues significantly while PeoplExpress got out of business soon. Following Ameri-
can, airlines like Delta, United and Southwest also started to use Yield Management
(Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2006; Cross et al., 2011).
Since hotels had a similar problem to airlines, i.e., managing a fixed capacity gen-
erally sold in advance, initial hotel systems were patterned after the airline systems.
Marriott International was the first hotel chain to use Yield Management. Since yield
is an airline term, Marriott called the practice “Revenue Management”. The other
hotel chains and casinos followed Marriott (Cross et al., 2009, 2011).
Today, revenue management is used in rental car, cruise ship, passenger rail, event,
tourism, shipping, media and broadcasting, retailing, manufacturing, and energy in-
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dustries (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2006)
1.3 Hotel Revenue Management
The science of airline yield management was based on forecasting demand at the fare
class level and then opening and closing the fares to fill the airplane to maximize rev-
enue (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004). On the other hand, the hotel industry developed
more granular forecasts of demand for individual rate categories and implemented
optimization systems to predict the demand and optimize the rate classes offered
(Cross et al., 2009). Although airlines mainly use advance-purchase restriction and
non-refundable ticket discounts, hotels often use weekend rate for price differentiation
(Friday and Saturday night stays).
In addition, some of the factors that hotels face are not an issue for airlines1.
Guests determine their length of stay, and hotel rooms are often blocked by group
commitments. Plus, ancillary revenues from food and beverage are a significant
portion of the hotel revenues.
Existence of several room types (e.g., suites, deluxe rooms, standard rooms) and
room differentiation within the same room type (e.g., rooms with a view or high-floor
rooms) make the capacity-control and pricing problem more complex. In Chapter 2,
we focus on how to use premium room capacity in a flexible manner through standby
upgrades and how to price premium rooms and these upgrades simultaneously. In
Chapter 3, we investigate the different type of customer behaviors facing this program.
1.4 Event Revenue Management
By event industry, we refer to stage events (e.g., theaters, orchestras) and sports
events. These events have many characteristics that suit well to revenue management
1Note that airlines also focus on complex problems on its network of flights (e.g., connecting
flights, round-trips)
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methods. Variable pricing where the price for a seat changes based on the expected
demand (for different times) has been common in this industry for a long time. Also,
the prices for each event depend on factors such as the seat location relative to stage
(or field), group affiliation of customers, and advance-purchase restrictions (Talluri
and Van Ryzin, 2006). Over the last few years, we also see dynamic pricing practices
gaining popularity for sports events with most teams enjoying significant revenue
improvements.
One of the interesting issues in this industry different than airline and hotel indus-
tries is the existence of “scalpers” who can charge extreme prices for popular events.
This creates a big potential in the event industry for the use of revenue management
methods. There are several organizers and teams who have created their own mar-
ketplace for resale of tickets to deal with this problem. An alternative is to use ticket
options, where customers initially buy an option to buy a ticket and then exercise it
at a later date. In Chapter 4, we focus on a specific type of ticket options where fans
can make a team-specific reservation for the right and obligation to purchase a face
value ticket if their team qualifies for the final game.
1.5 Revenue Management with Probabilistic Elements
Some revenue management tools introduce an uncertainty in to the assignment of
products to customers by using “probabilistic elements”. At the time of the purchase,
customers only know the set of the distinct products they may get, such as a retailer’s
red or green probabilistic sweater, where customer does not know which color they
will get (Fay and Xie, 2008).
In the hospitality and airline industries, we see probabilistic selling practices such
as opaque selling, flexible products, upgradable tickets and standby upgrades. In
opaque selling (e.g. Hotwire’s Hot Rate Hotels and Priceline’s Express Deals), the
identity of the hotel/airline is hidden until a nonrefundable booking is made. This
4
provides airlines and hotels with an additional way to price discriminate between
guests who are brand loyal and those who are willing to face uncertainty concerning
brands for reduced prices (Shapiro and Shi, 2008). In flexible products (e.g., Blind
Booking at Germanwings), a hotel/airline sells a menu of two or more alternatives,
where customers do not know where they will fly to or stay in exchange for a lower
price. This allows for supply side substitution even after sales (Gallego and Phillips,
2004; Post and Spann, 2012). In upgradable tickets (e.g., Alaska’s Upgradable fare),
airlines sell coach-class fares at a higher price and give customers a chance of enjoying
first class only if first-class seats remain unsold (Biyalogorsky et al., 2005). In standby
upgrades (e.g., Nor1’s e-standby upgrades), hotels offer discounted, availability-based
upgrades to guests who book a standard room, however the customer only pays if the
upgrade is awarded (Cui, 2015; Yılmaz et al., 2017).
In the events industry domain, we see probabilistic selling practices such as regular
options, team-specific tickets, conditional packages, and team-specific ticket options.
In regular options (e.g., OptionIt), the customer initially buys an option to reserve
a ticket from face value to exercise at a later date. In team-specific tickets (e.g.,
Optional team-specific tickets of FIFA World Cup), the customer reserves a ticket
and has to pay for the ticket only if his/her team advances to the specified game.
In conditional packages (e.g., On Location Experiences packages at the NFL Super
Bowl), the customer reserves packages (i.e., flight, hotel, and game tickets) for a final
game at a neutral site and has to buy the package only if his/her team advances to
final. Finally, in team-specific ticket options, fans make a team-specific reservation
for the right and obligation to purchase a face value ticket, if their team qualifies for
the final game.
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1.6 Positioning of This Dissertation
Revenue management addresses three basic categories of demand-management de-
cisions: Structural (e.g., which selling format or differentiation method to choose),
price (e.g., how to set posted prices, individual offers, markdowns), and quantity
(e.g., how to allocate capacity to different segments, whether to accept or reject an
offer). Traditional revenue management uses capacity control as a tactic by selling
different “products”, which are all supplied using the same, homogeneous capacity
(Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004).
On the other hand, given that firms now have rich data sets, customer-centric
revenue management has been replacing the long-standing inventory-centric approach
in modern era by focusing on understanding and predicting customer behavior and
then optimizing price and/or quantity related decisions (Cross and Dixit, 2005).
In this dissertation, we focus on two innovative revenue management practices,
hotel standby upgrades and team-specific ticket options, which create a flexibility in
capacity through probabilistic elements. We provide analytical insights on how to
price and how (and when) to use these products. In addition, using unique data sets,
we empirically investigate the customer behavior for these practices, which is crucial
in order to implement appropriate pricing strategies.
In particular, Chapter 2 discusses how to optimally price hotel standby upgrades
and evaluates their benefits through an analytical model. The paper from this chapter
has been published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management.2 Chapter
3 uses a major hotel chain’s booking and standby upgrades data to investigate the
extent of strategic guest behavior through empirical analysis. Chapter 4 studies fans’
decision-making process for College Football Playoff team-specific ticket options using
a unique data set.
2Throughout this dissertation, we cite this paper as Yılmaz et al. (2017).
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Chapter 2
Would You Like to Upgrade to a Premium
Room? Evaluating the Benefits of Offering
Standby Upgrades
2.1 Introduction
In the hotel and airline industries, the sale of products with a probabilistic nature has
become a popular way to price discriminate between customer segments and deal with
the uncertainty in demand. In the revenue management literature, there has been a
growing interest in investigating the benefit of these modern approaches compared
to more traditional practices such as dynamic pricing and the reserving of capacity
for higher value segments. Opaque selling is one example of probabilistic selling,
where the identity of the hotel/airline is hidden until a non-refundable booking is
made. Opaque selling provides airlines and hotels with an additional way to price
discriminate between guests who are brand loyal and those who are willing to face
uncertainty concerning brands for reduced prices (Shapiro and Shi, 2008). This selling
mechanism has been shown to dominate last-minute discounting, the other common
practice to dispose unsold capacity, except in the case where consumer valuations
are high and the probability of high demand is low (Jerath et al., 2010). Flexible
products, where a hotel/airline sells a menu of two or more alternatives (e.g., Blind
Booking at Germanwings), is a similar mechanism to opaque selling that allows for
supply-side substitution even after sales (Gallego and Phillips, 2004; Post and Spann,
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2012). Partially refundable fares is another example, where a fixed portion of the fare
is refundable if the traveler decides not to travel for any reason. This mechanism has
been shown to bring higher revenues than using non-refundable and fully refundable
fares (Gallego and Şahin, 2010).
While opaque selling, flexible products, and partially refundable fares mainly help
service providers manage their regular product capacity, such as a standard room at
a hotel or a coach seat on a plane, there are other forms of probabilistic selling
that are used for the management of premium product capacity. Upgradable air-
line tickets (i.e., coach-class fares that customers pay extra for and enjoy first class
only if first-class seats remain unsold) are used in the airline industry (Biyalogorsky
et al., 2005). A similar program, called standby upgrades, has recently been adopted
by many hotel chains (www.nor1.com/solutions/estandby-upgrade/) and a few
airlines (www.optiontown.com/). In the hotel industry, standby upgrades are dis-
counted, availability-based upgrades offered to guests who book standard rooms.
They serve as an alternative for front-desk upselling, which is argued to provide in-
consistent performance and is not widely adopted due to lack of execution by hotel
front desk personnel. While both standby upgrades and upgradable tickets are typi-
cally offered at the time of initial purchase, they differ in that guests only pay for a
standby upgrade if the upgrade is awarded.
For this research, we partnered with a major hotel chain to assess the existing
functionality of standby upgrades in the hotel industry and determine what improve-
ments can be made to the current practices. This hotel chain uses industry provider
Nor1’s standby upgrade solution called eStandby R© upgrades. The system works as
follows: After a guest (she) completes a hotel reservation through the hotel chain’s
website, she sees a link (in the website or via email) indicating that customized up-
grade offers are available. If she clicks the link, a list of discounted upgrade offers is
displayed (see Figure 2.1). These offers include room upgrades (e.g., standard gue-
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stroom to a suite), room features (e.g., city view), amenities (e.g., internet), early
check-in/late check-out, parking, spa services, etc. The guest selects the upgrade(s)
she is willing to purchase on standby. At the time of check-in, the guest learns
whether the upgrade(s) is awarded. If awarded, the guest is automatically charged
the agreed upon price for the upgrade; otherwise, she keeps the originally booked
room and pays nothing extra. This program is marketed as being beneficial for the
hotel by monetizing premium room inventory that may otherwise go unused, creating
awareness for add-on services (e.g., internet, spa), advertising room features (e.g., city
view) and improving guest satisfaction and loyalty. While our partner hotel chain
sees value in the service for selling auxiliary services such as internet and spa, they
fear that potential cannibalization of premium room sales may negate any benefit
achieved from the selling of standby upgrades for room upgrades. Thus, the primary
focus of this research is to investigate this concern and find out how these upgrades
can be used as a price discrimination tool for better capacity management.
Figure 2.1 Screenshot of e-Standby Upgrade Offers
Our partner’s properties set the price of their standard rooms using state-of-the-
art price optimization software. In contrast, these same properties set the premium
room price by simply adding a differential to the standard room price: 80 out of 91
hotel properties in our partner’s pricing data use the same differential every day and
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the remaining 11 change the differential only for certain days of stay. Moreover, since
the hotel properties are not directly owned by the hotel chain (they are franchised),
each individual property is responsible for making a decision on whether to implement
a standby upgrade program.
In this paper, we investigate the dynamics of standby upgrade programs and an-
swer the following research questions: When can standby upgrade programs provide
additional value over traditional revenue management practices? Which hotel en-
vironments and market characteristics reap the most benefit from standby upgrade
programs? What are the possible issues that hotels should be aware of while using
the standby upgrade programs?
To the best of our knowledge, Cui (2015) is the only other academic paper in-
vestigating hotel standby upgrades. In their analytical framework, strategic guests
arrive stochastically and have heterogeneous valuations for standard and premium
rooms, which are both assumed to have exogenous static prices. They focus on op-
timizing the standby upgrade price, and use a fluid model approximation due to the
complexity of the stochastic model. In our paper, we also ignore the problem of
standard room pricing because of the existence of sophisticated price optimization
software for this. However, we focus on the problem of simultaneously optimizing the
prices of the premium rooms and the standby upgrades based on the hotel’s premium
room capacity and market characteristics for a specific day of stay, considering both
myopic and strategic customer scenarios. Accordingly, our problem is similar to the
pre-announced single-discount problem in the markdown pricing literature (see Shen
and Su, 2007; Netessine and Tang, 2009, for a review). In the pre-announced pricing
problem, the seller uses a higher price during the initial stage of the selling horizon
and a pre-announced discounted price at the end. Customers decide between buying
the item at the time of their arrival or waiting until the end of the horizon in the hope
of achieving a lower price. If the customers wait to purchase, however, the item may
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become unavailable. Similarly, in the case of standby upgrades, the hotel sells pre-
mium rooms at a higher price and offers the standby upgrade at a discounted price.
Here, guests make a decision between a premium room (i.e., booking a premium room
initially or requesting a guaranteed upgrade after reserving a standard room) and the
standby upgrade, but they receive the premium room through the standby upgrade
only if there is remaining premium room capacity at the time of check-in.
Despite these similarities, there are also differences between our hotel environment
and retail environments where pre-announced price discounts are typically practiced.
First, in the standby upgrade problem, guests consider whether to buy or standby
for an upgrade from a standard room to a premium room (rather than a physical
product). Therefore, the standard room capacity of the hotel property has an effect
on the market size for this product. Our analysis shows that this market size also
presents a higher level of uncertainty (compared to the retail industry) because of the
market dynamics. These key differences require us to solve an optimization problem
where extreme scenarios (e.g., very low premium room demand) are possible and the
market size changes based on the hotel’s relative room capacities. In addition, hotels
may utilize standby upgrades to accommodate overbooked standard room demand,
which does not apply for the retail industry. Accordingly, we make the necessary
adjustments to the pre-announced discount models and develop a model where a
hotel simultaneously sets the prices for the premium room differential and the standby
upgrade.
Contributions and Key Insights
Several tactics for price differentiation are discussed in the literature, including group
pricing, channel pricing, and product versioning (see Phillips, 2005, for a review).
In this paper, we present an alternative for premium room pricing using standby
upgrades that is also flexible in accommodating different standard room pricing tech-
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niques.
We first discuss our modeling contributions. We provide a practical framework
with simultaneous arrivals and an uncertain market size, which is a better fit for our
hotel setting compared with the modeling frameworks previously used in the pre-
announced pricing literature: those that assume simultaneous arrivals assume a fixed
market size, and those that assume stochastic arrivals lead to complicated models
that do not allow for closed-form solutions. When guests are strategic, this framework
allows us to demonstrate the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium, i.e., an
equilibrium between the guests’ belief about the fill rate (the probability of getting
a premium room through standby upgrades) and the expected realization of the
outcome. We show that the equilibrium fill rate can be less than 1 for days/hotels
where the market size for premium rooms is large, and thus standby upgrades can act
as a price discrimination tool. We also investigate how standby upgrades can be used
to facilitiate the overbooking of standard rooms, where the hotel has to use some of
the premium room capacity to satisfy excess standard room demand.
Our paper provides several key insights for hoteliers. First, we show that the
benefit of offering standby upgrades is highest when the market size for premium
rooms is small and guests are myopic. If guests are strategic, however, we find that
standby upgrades can be beneficial only when the market size for premium rooms
is large. We also analyze the consequences of making incorrect assumptions on the
type of guest behavior and show that misidentifying strategic guests as myopic, or
myopic guests as strategic can result in a significant revenue loss. Additionally, we
show conditions where standby upgrades can provide revenue improvement over front-
desk upsells and that standby upgrades may offer additional benefits when the hotel
satisfies overbooked standard room demand using premium room capacity. Finally,
using our partner’s data, we identify the hotel types and environments that are most
suitable for standby upgrades.
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2.2 Model Overview
In this section, we go through our model assumptions. Since we investigate how
standby upgrades can be used for price discrimination, we omit the type of standby
upgrades whose main benefit is to create awareness for ancillary products with nearly
unlimited capacity (e.g., spa, internet) and luxury upgrades (e.g., executive suites)
with extremely low likelihood of an upgrade. We instead focus on incremental room
upgrades (e.g., higher floor, ocean view, a standard suite) where we believe that the
market for the premium rooms is closely connected to the standard room demand,
which will be explained further.
Assumption 2.1. Premium Room Capacity: The hotel has two types of rooms: stan-
dard and premium. Without loss of generality, the premium room capacity, C, is
normalized to one.
In our partner’s data set, each hotel has one standard room type and one or more
premium room types. For simplicity, we model a hotel with only one type of premium
room (with capacity C = 1) and one type of standby upgrade offer, i.e., an upgrade
from a standard room to a premium room. Most hotels at our partner’s properties
employ pricing techniques for their standard rooms that adjust prices dynamically to
achieve a target occupancy rate, e.g., increasing the price when the expected demand
rate is higher than the target rate. While standby upgrades can also be used to
relieve oversold situations for hoteliers, our base model assumes that standard room
demand is never constrained and the benefit of standby upgrades is expected to
come from monetizing premium room inventory that may otherwise go undervalued
or unsold. Therefore, the results of our base model only apply to the cases where
standard rooms do not sell out. We later relax the unconstrained standard room
demand assumption in §2.3.4, and consider a setting where the standard rooms are
overbooked, i.e., standard room demand exceeds standard room capacity. In this
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setting, we demonstrate how standby upgrade programs can be used to relieve the
pressure on standard room capacity.
Assumption 2.2. Pricing Decisions: At the beginning of the selling horizon for a
specific day-of-stay, based on the market size expectation, the hotel determines a fixed
premium room differential, p, and standby upgrade price, pS, that is pegged to the
standard room price (s) throughout the selling horizon.
We only focus on the pricing of the premium rooms because hotels generally
use sophisticated techniques for setting the standard room prices based on different
demand patterns (Koushik et al., 2012; Pekgün et al., 2013), and our hotel partner
was not interested in changing the way they set their standard room prices. The data
set from our partner and other examples from the industry show that it is common
practice to set the premium room price as a function of the standard room price
through fixed differentials. Accordingly, we set the premium room price as a function
of the standard room price in our model. We include two decision variables: the
premium room differential and the standby upgrade price. Note that we also allow
the hotel to make changes to the differentials based on the market size expectation for
a specific day. By focusing on the differential between standard and premium room
prices, our approach can be used in conjunction with any standard room pricing
approach, static or dynamic.
Assumption 2.3. Allocation of Premium Rooms: After observing the demand for
premium rooms, DP , and the demand for standby upgrades, DS, the hotel uses a
random allocation policy for the premium room capacity if the number of remaining
premium rooms is less than the number of the standby upgrades requested.
For a given day of stay, the hotel first determines p and pS. Nature then draws
a market size for premium rooms, x (see Assumption 5 for details about the market
size). Guests arrive and each guest makes a booking decision —and a standby upgrade
decision if a standard room is booked. If the premium room demand, DP , turns out
14
to be greater than the premium room capacity, this would be equivalent to a real-
life scenario of a premium room sell-out before the end of the selling horizon. On
the other hand, if the premium room demand, DP , turns out to be less than the
premium room capacity, the leftover premium capacity can be used to satisfy the
standby upgrade demand using an allocation mechanism. In our partner’s data set,
we were not able to identify any particular allocation patterns, therefore we assume
a random allocation policy if the number of remaining premium rooms is less than
the number of the standby upgrades requested, DS. Note that pS will be charged
only when the standby upgrade request is granted (see Figure 2.2 for the order of the
events).
0
Hotel determines 𝑝 and 𝑝𝑆
Nature draws market size 𝑥 Premium rooms are allocated
Hotel observes 𝐷𝑃 and 𝐷𝑆
Figure 2.2 The Order of the Events
Assumption 2.4. Valuation Distribution for the Premium Room Differential: A
guest’s valuation for the premium room differential, v, is uniformly distributed in the
interval [0, 1] and is constant over time.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the valuation for the premium room differ-
ential and assume a uniform distribution, which is commonly used for guest valuations
(aka a linear price-demand model) in the markdown literature (Zhang and Cooper,
2008; Liu and van Ryzin, 2011). Moreover, Cohen et al. (2016) study the price-
demand curve estimation problem for new products and show that the assumption of
a linear demand results in very minor profit penalties even if the true demand curve
is far from linear.1
1To help validate our linear price-demand model assumption, we utilize our partner’s data on
the booking and standby upgrade decisions. The details of this study and further discussion on our
approach can be found in the Appendix A.
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Assumption 2.5. Market Size for Premium Rooms: The size of the market for
premium rooms observed for a specific day, x, is uniformly distributed in the interval
[0, XU ].
A major difference in our model compared to the studies in the markdown pricing
literature (Gallego et al., 2008; Liu and van Ryzin, 2008) is that the demand for
premium rooms is not based on a fixed market size. Our partner’s booking data shows
that premium room demand is positively correlated with standard room demand,
however there are many days where the standard room demand is high while the
premium room demand is relatively low.2 Therefore, it is important to factor in
uncertainty for the estimation of premium room demand.
We assume a stochastic market size that lies between a lower bound of 0 and
an upper bound of XU . With a heterogeneous market captured through a uniform
willingness-to-pay distribution and a stochastic market size, the premium room de-
mand and standby upgrade demand are (DP , DS) = [x(1 − p), x(p − pS)] where
x ∼ U(0, XU). Given the characteristics of the hotel industry, we list two main fac-
tors that affect the upper bound of the market size, XU : (i) The demand for standby
upgrades (and premium room bookings) mainly comes from customers who have a
positive utility for the standard rooms and thus consider booking a standard room.
For a typical day, the potential demand for premium rooms is inversely proportional
to the premium-to-standard room capacity ratio, i.e., the relative premium room
capacity. Therefore, the upper bound XU is a decreasing function of the relative
premium room capacity. (ii) A hotel may have different target occupancy rates based
on the characteristics of the day of stay (e.g., weekend vs. weekday, special event
in town). Our analysis shows that XU increases with the target occupancy rate (or
expected occupancy). This is an indirect effect of the target occupancy rate - due to
2A detailed discussion on the market size and an empirical study supporting this assumption
can be found in the Appendix A.
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the positive correlation between standard and premium bookings mentioned above.
Assumption 2.6. Visibility of the Standby Upgrade Offer: A guest can see a standby
upgrade offer only after completing a standard room booking.
This assumption comes directly from the industry provider Nor1’s website, which
states that guests can see a standby upgrade offer only after booking a standard
room.
Assumption 2.7. Myopic Guest Behavior: A guest makes a choice between booking
a standard room and a premium room at the time of booking. If she books a standard
room, she receives the standby upgrade offer and makes a decision on the offer based
on her valuation.
In the standby upgrades problem, there are several reasons to expect that most
hotel guests are myopic with respect to standby upgrades. First, many guests are
not aware of the existence of standby upgrade offers prior to booking a room. These
guests see and make a decision on the standby upgrade offer after making a decision
between a standard room and a premium room. Second, even guests who are aware of
standby upgrade offers will have difficulty estimating the chance of getting a premium
room through standby upgrades because they have limited information about the
past award rates of upgrade requests. Third, our hotel partner believes that the
vast majority of their guests would act myopically when making the standby upgrade
decision.
In contrast to a myopic guest, a strategic guest always books a standard room first
to see the standby upgrade price and then makes a decision between the standard
room, premium room or standby upgrade based on her valuation and the perceived
chance of obtaining a premium room through standby upgrades. After discussing our
base model, we analyze the scenario with strategic guests, who take rational actions
based on expected award rates, in §2.4.
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2.3 Base Model with Myopic Guests
In this section, we develop a base model with myopic guests and investigate the
benefits of standby upgrades compared to the three common practices in the industry
through analytical and numerical analysis. We also present a model extension where
the hotel utilizes premium room capacity to accommodate overbooked standard room
demand through standby upgrades.
2.3.1 Myopic Guest Behavior
Figure 2.3 presents the decision making process of a myopic guest in our model
(dashed arrows represent uncertainty in the outcome): For a price set (pS, p), a
myopic guest books the premium room initially if her valuation is v ∈ [p, 1]. If v < p,
she books a standard room and sees the standby upgrade offer. If v ∈ [pS, p), she
accepts the offer, otherwise she rejects.
Standard
Premium
Offer
Standard
Premium
NO
YES
Standard
Figure 2.3 Myopic Guest’s Decision Making Process
For a specific day with a realized market size x, premium room demand (DP ) is
equal to x(1− p) and standby upgrade demand (DS) is equal to x(p− pS). However,
these demands may not be fully satisfied because of the capacity constraint. Given
a price set (pS, p) and a realized market size x, we use the notation (CP , CS) for the
premium room capacity allocated to premium room bookings and standby upgrades,
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respectively, for a specific day. Since regular bookings of premium rooms occur imme-
diately, the allocation of remaining premium rooms to the standby upgrade request
may result in three different cases of (CP , CS), each of which is referred to as an
outcome (Oi):
In O1, the hotel can fully satisfy premium room and standby upgrade demand
(DS+DP ≤ 1). In O2, the hotel can fully satisfy the premium room demand (DP < 1)
but can only partially satisfy the standby upgrade demand (DS + DP > 1). In O3,
the premium room demand exceeds the capacity (DP ≥ 1), i.e., premium rooms are
sold out during the sale horizon and none of the standby upgrades can be awarded.
We can write (CP , CS) as follows:
(CP , CS) =

(DP , DS) if DS +DP ≤ 1
(DP , 1−DP ) if DP < 1 and DS +DP > 1
(1, 0) if DP ≥ 1
Since the capacities allocated to premium room bookings and standby upgrades
change in each case, the revenue functions are also different. For a given (pS, p), the
realized market size x is the only factor that affects (CP , CS), and we can write the
conditions for each outcome and resulting revenues as follows:
x Outcome Revenue
0 ≤ x ≤ 11−pS O1 R1 = (x(1− p))p+ (x(p− pS))pS
1
1−pS < x <
1
1−p O2 R2 = (x(1− p))p+ (1− x(1− p))pS
1
1−p ≤ x O3 R3 = p
Note that for a specific day with a given (pS, p) and XU , O1 is always a possible
outcome because x can take a value of 0 (x ∼ U(0, XU)). However, O2 and O3 may
not be observed in all cases. For example, consider a day when XU = 3. For price set
(0.4, 0.6), the hotel observes O1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 53 , O2 for 53 < x < 52 and O3 for 52 ≤ x ≤ 3,
i.e., the prices are too low and a sell-out is possible (see Figure 2.4). If the hotel uses
19
0 0.4 0.6 1 0 0.4 0.6 1 0 0.4 0.6 1
3 3 3
1
2
2. 8
Figure 2.4 Possible Outcomes for Price Set (0.4,0.6) when XU= 3
Left (O1): For x = 1, DS +DP = 0.6 ≤ 1. Center (O2): For x = 2, DP = 0.8 < 1
but DS +DP = 1.2 > 1. Right (O3): For x = 2.8, DP = 1.12 ≥ 1.
price set (0.5, 0.75), it observes O1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 2 and O2 for 2 < x ≤ 3, but not O3.
For price set (0.7, 0.8), the hotel can only observe O1 (DP +DS = 0.6 + 0.3 < 1 even
for the extreme case x = 3), i.e., the prices are too high and the hotel cannot fill its
capacity.
2.3.2 Optimal Pricing Problem with Myopic Guests (MY)
The hotel’s expected revenue for premium rooms can be written as:
Π(p, pS, XU) =
XU∫
0
[
pCP (pS, p, x) + pSCS(pS, p, x)
]
dx (2.1)
Since our realized market size for premium rooms is stochastic, different price sets
may lead to different sets of outcomes based on x for a given XU . We use the term
strategy to group different price sets leading to the same set of outcomes. As we
discussed above, {O1}, {O1, O2}, and {O1, O2, O3} are the feasible outcome sets that
we can observe. Therefore, a hotel can use one of three possible strategies for a given
day of stay. We use binary variables I1, I2, and I3 to represent each strategy:
Strategy 1 (I1 = 1): Choosing a price set (pS, p) that satisfies XU(1− pS) ≤ 1
leads to an outcome set {O1} since x(1− pS)≤1 for all x. The hotel’s expected
revenue is:
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ΠMY 1 =
XU∫
0
R1
XU
dx. (2.2)
Strategy 2 (I2 = 1): Choosing a price set (pS, p) that satisfies XU(1− pS) > 1
and XU(1 − p) < 1 leads to an outcome set {O1, O2}. The hotel’s expected
revenue is:
ΠMY 2 =
1/(1−pS)∫
0
R1
XU
dx+
XU∫
1/(1−pS)
R2
XU
dx. (2.3)
Strategy 3 (I3 = 1): Choosing a price set (pS, p) that satisfies XU(1− p) ≥ 1
leads to an outcome set {O1, O2, O3}. The hotel’s expected revenue is:
ΠMY 3 =
1/(1−pS)∫
0
R1
XU
dx+
1/(1−p)∫
1/(1−pS)
R2
XU
dx+
XU∫
1/(1−p)
R3
XU
dx. (2.4)
We solve the following revenue maximization problem to find the optimal price
set (pMYS , pMY ) for a given XU :
max
0≤pS≤p≤1
I1ΠMY 1 + I2ΠMY 2 + I3ΠMY 3
s.t. I1[XU(1− pS)− 1] ≥ 0; I2[XU(1− pS)− 1] ≤ 0; I2[XU(1− p)− 1] ≥ 0;
I3[XU(1− p)− 1] ≤ 0; I1 + I2 + I3 = 1; I1, I2, I3 ∈ {0, 1} (2.5)
Lemma 2.1 presents the hotel’s optimal pricing policy:3
Lemma 2.1. When the hotel uses a standby upgrade program, the optimal price set
(pMYS , pMY ) for a given XU under myopic guest behavior is as follows:
(pMYS , pMY ) =

(13 ,
2
3) if XU ≤ 32
(3XU−43XU − 2Υ,
3XU−2
3XU −Υ) if 32 < XU < 4(
1− 13√2XU , 1−
1
3
√
(2XU )2
)
if XU ≥ 4
(2.6)
The resulting expected revenue ΠMY is:
ΠMY =

XU
6 if XU ≤ 32
9XU (6Υ(XU (Υ(XUΥ−2)+2)−3)+5)−44
36XU (3XUΥ+2) if
3
2 < XU < 4
1− 33√(2XU )2 +
1
XU
if XU ≥ 4
(2.7)
3The details on the term Υ and the proof of this lemma can be found in the Appendix B.
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We can interpret the hotel’s optimal policy as follows: When the upper bound of
market size, XU , for a specific day is low (XU ≤ 32), the hotel should choose Strategy
1 in which the premium room and standby upgrade demand are fully satisfied (DS +
DP ≤ 1 for all x). In this strategy, the hotel can only use the price discrimination
power of standby upgrades because of the relatively low expected market size. On
the other hand, when XU for a specific day is high (XU ≥ 4), the hotel should choose
Strategy 3, where it charges relatively lower prices to generate more demand (with
a risk of sell-out since DP > 1 for some x) and benefit from higher occupancy rates.
In this case, the hotel uses both the price discrimination and capacity management
power of the standby upgrades. When XU for a specific day is medium (32 < XU < 4),
the hotel should choose Strategy 2. In this strategy, the hotel does not reward all of
the standby upgrades when the total premium room and standby upgrade demand is
higher than the premium room capacity (DS + DP > 1 for some x); however, there
is no risk of sell-out (DP < 1 for all x).
2.3.3 Comparison with Common Practices in the Hotel Industry
To evaluate the benefits of standby upgrades, we make comparisons with the three
common practices in the industry for premium room pricing as identified by our
partner hotel chain. The common practices include no standby upgrade program, de-
ploying a standby upgrade program without changing the premium room differential,
and offering a discounted upgrade at the front-desk during the check-in process. We
first introduce each practice, and then provide a numerical analysis on the comparison
of benefits.
No Standby Upgrade Program (NS)
The common practice for setting the premium room prices for hotel properties is to
add a fixed markup to the standard room prices, where the markup is typically not
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optimized. In our first benchmark, we develop a model in which the hotel does not
use a standby upgrade program, but does optimize the premium room differential, p,
based on the market size distribution. The guest behavior is straightforward; guests
with a valuation v ∈ [p, 1] book premium rooms and those with [0, p) book standard
rooms (see the dashed box in Figure 2.3). In this setting, the optimal premium room
differential, pNS, and the resulting expected revenue, ΠNS, for a given XU are as
follows:
pNS =

1
2 if XU ≤ 2
1− 1√2XU if XU > 2
ΠNS =

XU
8 if XU ≤ 2
1− 2√2XU +
1
2XU if XU > 2
(2.8)
By comparing the optimal prices and expected revenues of our standby upgrade
model against this benchmark, we reach the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1. (i) Using standby upgrades is always beneficial as compared to the
no-standby-upgrade benchmark (ΠMY > ΠNS) for all XU . (ii) The following order of
prices always holds: pMYS < pNS < pMY .
Proposition 2.1 states that the hotel should increase its premium room price with
the introduction of the standby upgrade program, and offer a relatively deep discount
(30% to 50% for reasonable XU values) from this new price for the standby upgrades.
These changes result in additional revenue for the hotel through price discrimination
and improved capacity management.
Independent Pricing of the Differential and Standby Upgrades (2S)
Our results show that the premium room differential should increase (pMY > pNS)
with the introduction of a standby upgrade program. However, our partner’s data
shows that most hotels did not change their premium room differentials when they
started using standby upgrades. Convincing them to change this practice requires
quantifying the additional benefit of adjusting the premium room differential when
introducing a standby upgrade program.
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To do so, consider a hotel which optimizes its premium room differential pricing
before the introduction of standby upgrades and continues to use the same differential
(i.e., pNS) with the standby upgrade program. The optimal standby upgrade price
for this hotel, denoted by p2SS , is:
p2SS =

1
4 if XU ≤ 43
1− 1√
4XU−X2U
2
if 43 < XU ≤ 2
1− 14√2XU if XU > 2
(2.9)
While the hotel can still price discriminate using this sequential optimization, we
find that the optimal prices for the premium room differential and standby upgrades
are lower than those under simultaneous optimization (i.e., p2SS < pMYS and pNS <
pMY ).
Front-Desk Upsells (FDU)
Front-desk upselling is a well-known traditional technique to improve hotel revenue,
where arriving guests are offered an opportunity to upgrade their room at the time
of check-in. The main advantage of this technique is that the upsell is made at the
end of the selling horizon, after the market size is revealed. Today, most hotels do
not use formalized programs for front-desk upselling due to the lack of a centralized
tool and difficulty of implementation at the front-desk. On the other hand, some
hotels use decision support tools (e.g., TSA Solutions’ platform and Nor1’s eFDU
platform) which help them decide on the front-desk upsell price for a given premium
room differential. Even for these hotels, the actual application of front-desk upselling
is inconsistent, as it depends on the front-desk agent to make the guest aware of the
offer.4
4Except for hotels that primarily offer an electronic check-in kiosk, the front-desk staff often
finds it difficult to consistently offer upsells during busy check-in periods due to the pressure to
check-in guests as quickly as possible.
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Consider a hotel which offers front-desk upsells and let f ∈ [0, 1] be the percentage
of the arriving guests who receive an upsell offer. After the market size is revealed, the
hotel will have
[
1− x(1− p)
]+
premium rooms available. If this number is positive,
the hotel front-desk staff will make upsell offers to f of arriving guests who have
booked standard rooms.
The intuition behind the pricing of upsells is straightforward; the number of up-
grades available is bounded by the number of leftover premium rooms. In order to
use all remaining capacity, the hotel must set the upsell price at fpx−px+x−1
fx
. How-
ever, selling all the remaining room capacity is only optimal when fpx−px+x−1
fx
≥ p2 ;
therefore, the optimal upsell price, denoted by pFDU , is:
pFDU = max[fpx− px+ x− 1
fx
,
p
2] (2.10)
We analyze two front-desk upsell policies as benchmarks. In the first benchmark
(FDU1), we assume that the hotel does not factor in the possibility of front-desk
upselling when setting the premium room differential (therefore using the no standby
upgrade optimal differential pNS) based on our partner’s implementation of front-
desk upsells. We only provide results for the scenario where f = 1 for FDU1 since it
provides an upper bound for expected revenues. In the second benchmark (FDU2),
we assume that the hotel optimizes the premium room differential p by factoring in
the front-desk upselling. Note that FDU2 is beyond the common practice in the hotel
industry.5 We next present the benefits of standby upgrades in comparison to each
of these practices.
Measuring the Benefits of Standby Upgrades
To demonstrate the effectiveness of standby upgrades, we conduct a numerical anal-
ysis for different XU values. Our analysis in over 20 properties shows that XU is
5The detailed analyses on FDU1 and FDU2 are available from the authors upon request.
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unlikely to be greater than 6. Therefore, we perform our numerical analysis for
1 ≤ XU ≤ 6. We use the percentage improvement in revenue ΠMY −ΠCΠC as a perfor-
mance metric (where ΠC is the expected revenue of the policy compared). Table 2.1
provides a summary of our numerical analysis.
Table 2.1 Additional % Benefit of Standby Upgrades Compared to Common
Practices in Hotel Industry
vs. NS vs. 2S vs. FDU1 vs. FDU2
f = 0.6 f = 1
XU
1 33.33 6.66 6.66 13.33 0
2 29.33 10.39 8.77 10.36 -1.69
3 22.10 5.99 4.26 5.30 -4.30
4 19.64 5.04 3.28 3.56 -4.97
5 18.42 4.83 3.06 2.82 -5.05
6 17.45 4.67 2.90 2.26 -5.10
In comparison with no standby upgrades (NS), our results show that the revenue
improvement from using standby upgrades is ∼33% for lower values of XU (i.e.,
XU ≤ 32) and decreases as XU increases (∼17.5% when XU = 6 in Table 2.1). Two
main drivers of this benefit are as follows: First, standby upgrades increase the
overall demand for the premium rooms, with an 8% to 10% increase in the expected
occupancy rates (i.e., E[CP + CS]). Second, standby upgrades offer better capacity
utilization for premium rooms, up to a 20% increase in the full occupancy rates
(i.e., P{CP + CS = 1}) and down to a 30% decrease in the sell-out probability (i.e.,
P{DP > 1}) for premium rooms. These benefits decrease with higher values of XU ,
as the probability of a standby upgrade not being awarded or premium room demand
not being satisfied is non-decreasing in XU .
In comparison with independent pricing (2S), we find that the revenue improve-
ment ranges between 4.5% to 10.5%. Thus, the hotels which have not updated their
premium room differential with the introduction of a standby upgrade program may
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benefit from increasing both the premium room differential and the standby upgrade
price.
In comparison with front-desk upselling (FDU), our results show that the rev-
enue improvement ranges between 3% to 9% against the common front-desk upselling
practice (FDU1) for f = 1, which indicates that the benefit of simultaneously opti-
mizing the premium room price differential and standby upgrade price at the start of
the selling horizon dominates the benefit of postponing the setting of the upsell price
until full information on the market size is revealed. On the other hand, standby
upgrades are dominated by the practice of setting the premium room differential in
anticipation of front-desk upselling (FDU2) when the percentage of upsell offers made
to arriving guests is high (e.g., f = 1). However, for hotels which cannot achieve con-
sistent offering of upsells (e.g., f = 0.6), our results show that standby upgrades will
often provide revenue improvements.
2.3.4 Extension: What if the Standard Rooms are Overbooked?
In our base model, we assume that the standard room demand is never constrained
by the standard room capacity because of the dynamic pricing techniques employed
by the hotel chain for setting the standard room prices. However occasionally, there
may be days where there is excess demand for standard rooms (e.g., when there is
a special event such as a convention or a football game in town), and the hotel may
utilize its premium rooms to accommodate oversold standard room capacity through
free upgrades.
In this subsection, we consider a scenario where the hotel utilizes standby upgrades
to help generate additional revenue from the premium room capacity set aside to
satisfy overbooked standard room demand. Let w denote the number of premium
rooms to be used to satisfy excess standard room demand. We assume that the hotel
will keep the premium room bookings less than or equal to 1 − w since “walking
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Figure 2.5 Benefit of Standby Upgrades with Overbooking
a guest” is costly. Note that this problem is not equivalent to renormalizing the
premium room capacity to 1−w and applying the base model, since the total demand
for premium rooms (i.e., premium room bookings and standby upgrades) is still
constrained by the original premium room capacity of 1.
In our analysis, we only consider scenarios where w ∈ [0, 0.5], as it is unlikely for a
hotel to allocate more than 50% of the premium rooms to accommodate overbooked
standard room demand. We derive the optimal premium room differential, p(w),
standby upgrade price, pS(w) and resulting expected revenue Π(w), and present the
main results:6
Proposition 2.2. Let H(w) = 4(1+w)(1−w)2. (i) When XU ≤ H(w), p(w) = pMY
and pS(w) = pMYS for any w ∈ [0, 0.5]. Moreover, Π(w) does not change in w. (ii)
When XU > H(w), p(w) and pS(w) increase in w. On the other hand, Π(w) decreases
in w.
Proposition 2.2 indicates that the optimal pricing policy under the base model
(Lemma 2.1) is robust to overbooking accommodations for small XU values; however,
6The details of this analysis can be found in the Appendix B.
28
the set of these XU values gets smaller as w increases since the threshold H(w) is
a decreasing function of w ∈ [0, 0.5]. For XU > H(w), the hotel should increase its
prices as w increases to control the demand.
Although the expected revenue is non-increasing in w, we show that the benefit of
standby upgrades7 is non-decreasing in w (see Figure 2.5). The reason is as follows:
When standby upgrades are not utilized, the hotel can achieve revenue through pre-
mium room bookings only for the 1 − w of its premium rooms. On the other hand,
standby upgrades allow the hotel to make additional revenue from the allotted (un-
bookable) premium room capacity, w. For higher values of w, i.e., when the rooms set
aside for the oversold standard room capacity is high, the lost revenue opportunity
due to free upgrades would be even higher; therefore, we observe an increased benefit
of utilizing standby upgrades.
2.4 A Model with Strategic Guests
Our hotel chain partner’s data set consists of over 100 worldwide hotels using standby
upgrades and contains details about guests’ booking and standby upgrade decisions.
Given that not all standby offers are room upgrades and guests may choose more
than one room upgrade offer from the list, we divide the number of guests who were
awarded a standby room upgrade by the number of guests who requested at least
one standby room upgrade, and obtain an approximate fill rate, i.e., the likelihood of
getting a premium room through standby upgrades, of 50.3% (51281 out of 101937
guests who requested a standby upgrade were awarded a premium room at the time
of booking). This high fill rate suggests that some guests with valuations higher than
the premium room differential may choose to opt for standby upgrade offers instead
of booking premium rooms directly, in contrast to the myopic guests’ case discussed
7We use Π(w)−ΠNS(w)ΠNS(w) as the performance metric where ΠNS(w) is the expected revenue from
the no standby upgrade benchmark if the hotel offers w free upgrades to accommodate overbooked
standard room demand.
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in §2.3. In the hotel industry, it is commonly believed that repeat guests may form a
better understanding of the hotel’s premium room capacity and market characteristics
for a specific stay, and thus, these guests are more likely to act strategically.
In this section, we analyze a case where all guests are strategic. We begin by
defining strategic guest behavior and demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium
between the guests’ belief about the fill rate and the expected realization of the fill
rate. We then determine the optimal pricing strategy and make comparisons with
some of the strategies presented in §2.3.
2.4.1 Strategic Guest Behavior
A strategic guest can make a forward-looking decision based on prices and her per-
ception of the fill rate but cannot see the standby upgrade price before completing a
booking. Note that we do not assume that strategic guests can anticipate the correct
standby upgrade price before making their booking decision. Such an assumption
would require that the guests are trained in advanced optimization and have access
to historical demand data that is only available to the hotels. Instead, we assume that
a guest can be strategic if she has a non-negative utility for a standard room booking.
Accordingly, a strategic guest would always book a standard room first; then make a
decision between staying with the standard room, accepting the standby upgrade of-
fer, or booking a premium room (i.e., upgrading, simply changing her standard room
reservation to a premium room reservation) based on her valuation v. We assume
that strategic guests know the premium room capacity C and the upper bound of
the market size XU (i.e., they have full information after seeing pS). Similar to the
existing literature, we also assume that strategic guests share a common belief about
the expected fill rate, r′.
In the analysis of strategic behavior, the first step is to identify the valuation of
a guest who is indifferent between booking a premium room and choosing a standby
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upgrade for a given (pS, p) and r′. This valuation, v˜, must satisfy r′(v˜ − pS) = v˜ − p
given p > pS, which can be written as
v˜ = p− r
′pS
1− r′ (2.11)
Note that v˜ can be in (p, 1], but also in (1,∞). When r′ = 1, then v˜ = ∞. Since
the valuation of guests in our model is in [0, 1], there exists a guest who is indifferent
between choosing a premium room and standby upgrade when v˜ ∈ (p, 1]. On the
other hand, when v˜ ∈ (1,∞), there are no guests indifferent between these two
products because r′ is high enough that standby upgrades fully cannibalize premium
room bookings. For notational simplicity, we define z = min(1, v˜).
Figure 2.6 presents the decision making process of a strategic guest in our model:
After booking a standard room and seeing pS, a strategic guest with a valuation
v ∈ [z, 1] directly upgrades to a premium room and one with v ∈ [pS, z) chooses
to accept the standby upgrade offer. A strategic guest with v ∈ [0, pS) keeps the
standard room booking.
Standard
Premium
Offer
Standard
Premium
NO
YES
Standard
𝑣∈[𝑝𝑆, 𝑧)
UPGRADE
𝑣∈[0,1]
Figure 2.6 Strategic Guest’s Decision Making Process
For a specific day with realized market size x, the premium room demand (DP )
is equal to x(1 − z) and standby upgrade demand (DS) is equal to x(z − pS). The
premium room capacities allocated to premium room bookings and standby upgrades,
(CP , CS), can be written as a function of DP and DS in the same way as in §2.3. The
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realized fill rate, denoted by r, is equal to CS
DS
. With algebraic manipulations, we can
write r as a function of pS, z and x:
r = min
[
1, [1− x(1− z)]
+
x(z − pS)
]
(2.12)
As in the myopic customer case, we have three possible outcomes. For a given
(pS, p) and z, the realized market size x is the only factor that affects (CP , CS). The
conditions for each outcome, resulting revenues, and fill rates are as follows:
x Outcome Revenue Fill Rate (r)
0 ≤ x ≤ 11−pS O1 R1 = (x(z − pS))pS + (x(1− z))p 1
1
1−pS < x <
1
1−z O2 R2 = (1− x(1− z))pS + (x(1− z))p 1−x(1−z)x(z−pS)
x ≥ 11−z O3 R3 = p 0
In line with the previous literature, we assume that strategic guests can correctly
anticipate the expected fill rate. In a deterministic setting, the actual fraction of
standby upgrade demand satisfied (r) should be equal to the common belief of guests
(r′). For such a setting, Zhang and Cooper (2008) use a constraint where the perceived
fill rate is equal to the actual fill rate, which in turn is a function of the perceived fill
rate and prices (pg. 424, Eq. 23). However, the stochastic nature of our model leads
to uncertainty in the fill rate. Therefore, we assume that the guests’ common belief
r′ should be equal to the expectation of the realization of the fill rate, E[r]. We know
that r in our model is a function of the realized market size x, price set (pS, p) and
z. However, z is a function of r′ from z = min(1, v˜) and Eq. (2.11). Therefore, we
can write the relationship between r and r′ using a similar approach to Zhang and
Cooper (2008):
r′ = E[r(pS, p, r′, x)] (2.13)
Next, we combine Eq. (2.12) and Eq. (2.13) to form the following lemma:
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Lemma 2.2. (Rational Expectations Equilibrium) Given that strategic guests’ com-
mon belief r′ is a function of the fill rate r, and r is a function of r′, there must exist
an equilibrium between r′and r, which is given by:
r′ = E
[
min
(
1, [1− x(1− z)]
+
x(z − pS)
)]
(2.14)
2.4.2 Optimal Pricing Problem with Strategic Guests (ST)
When guests are strategic, the optimization problem becomes:
max
0≤pS≤p≤z≤1
Π(p, pS, z, r′, XU) =
XU∫
0
[pCP (pS, p, z, r′, x) + pSCS(pS, p, z, r′, x)] dx
(2.15)
s.t. r′ = E
[
min
(
1, [1− x(1− z)]
+
x(z − pS)
)]
; z = min
[
1, p− r
′pS
1− r′
]
(2.16)
Given the stochastic nature of the market size for premium rooms, we can show
that a given price set may lead to different sets of outcomes based on x. However,
we only consider the cases where the rational expectations equilibrium holds, and list
these as follows:
Strategy 1: Choosing a price set (pS, p) that satisfies XU(1 − pS)≤1 leads to an
outcome set {O1} and r′ = r = 1. In this strategy, none of the guests book premium
rooms (z = 1) and the standby upgrades are fully satisfied.
Strategy 2: Choosing a price set (pS, p) that satisfiesXU(1−pS) > 1 andXU(1−z) ≤
1 leads to an outcome set {O1, O2}. In this strategy, we can observe the rational
expectations equilibrium in two cases:
• Case 1 (r′ ≥ 1−p1−pS ): In this case, choosing a standby upgrade dominates
booking a premium room even for a customer with v = 1. Therefore, z = 1 and
the following should hold:
(1− p) ≤ (1− pS)
 1/(1−pS)∫
0
1
XU
dx+
XU∫
1/(1−pS)
1
x(1− pS)
1
XU
dx
 (2.17)
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• Case 2 (r′ < 1−p1−pS ): In this case, there exists a guest who is indifferent between
choosing a standby upgrade and booking a premium room. Therefore, z < 1
and the following should hold:
(z − p) = (z − pS)
 1/(1−pS)∫
0
1
XU
dx+
XU∫
1/(1−pS)
1− x(1− z)
x(z − pS)
1
XU
dx
 (2.18)
Strategy 3: Choosing a price set (pS, p) that satisfies XU(1 − z) > 1 leads to an
outcome set {O1, O2, O3} and z < 1. The following should hold:
(z−p) = (z−pS)
 1/(1−pS)∫
0
1
XU
dx+
1/(1−z)∫
1/(1−pS)
1− x(1− z)
x(z − pS)
1
XU
dx+
XU∫
1/(1−z)
0
XU
dx
 (2.19)
Because of the complicated nature of the optimization problem, there are no
closed-form solutions for the optimal price set (pSTS , pST ) and the resulting expected
revenue ΠST . However, our model properties allow us to reach the following lemma:
Lemma 2.3. When guests are strategic, the hotel should use Strategy 1 for XU ≤ 2
and use Strategy 3 otherwise.
Lemma 2.3 states that when the upper bound of the market size, XU , for a specific
day is low (XU ≤ 2), the hotel should use a pricing strategy where all guests choose
standby upgrades as the expected fill rate will be equal to 1 (or should not offer
standby upgrades at all). This result is similar to the optimal solution of the fluid
model in Cui (2015), where standby upgrades fully cannibalize the premium room
bookings. However, we additionally find that when XU is higher (XU > 2), the
hotel should use a pricing strategy where some guests choose premium rooms and
some choose standby upgrades, which is a new insight that suggests to hoteliers that
standby upgrades can act as an effective price discrimination tool even if the guests
are strategic.
2.4.3 Benefits of Standby Upgrades with Strategic Guests
We now compare the optimal strategy under strategic customers with the two models
from §2.3 to form the following proposition:
34
Proposition 2.3. When guests are strategic, standby upgrades do not bring any
benefit to the hotel if XU ≤ 2 (ΠST = ΠNS). When XU > 2, standby upgrades are
always beneficial as compared to the no-standby-upgrade benchmark (ΠST > ΠNS).
However, strategic guest behavior hurts the hotel revenues as compared to the myopic
guest behavior (ΠST < ΠMY ).
In the benchmark model with no standby upgrades, all guests with a valuation v ≥
p choose premium rooms. Similarly, all strategic guests with a valuation v ≥ pS choose
standby upgrades for the optimal price set (pSTS , pST ) when XU ≤ 2; therefore, it is
straightforward to see that pSTS = pNS. This leads to ΠST = ΠNS, which implies that a
standby upgrade program cannot bring additional revenue to the hotel forXU ≤ 2 (see
Figure 2.7a). Recall that in our benchmark model the hotel adjusts the premium room
differential based on the market characteristics for a specific day of stay. Now consider
a benchmark where the hotel does not adjust its premium room differential. In this
case, the standby upgrade program can be used as a price correction mechanism,
since the premium room differential is incorrectly priced and standby upgrades make
the necessary adjustment after taking the market characteristics into account.
When XU > 2, a standby upgrade program brings additional revenue because the
expected fill rates are no longer extremely high and standby upgrades can be used to
price discriminate between the high and low valuation guests (see Figure 2.7a). This
additional revenue, however, decreases when the guests are strategic. To see this,
consider an example using a similar performance metric ΠST−ΠNSΠNS as in the previous
sections. The revenue improvement is only 4.24% for XU = 6 when the guests are
strategic compared to 17.45% when the guests were myopic. Moreover, although the
revenue improvement is non-increasing in XU when guests are myopic, the standby
upgrade programs are not beneficial for low XU values and only bring additional
revenue as XU becomes larger when the guests are strategic.
The following observation compares optimal prices based on the guest behavior:
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Figure 2.7 Comparison of Strategic Guest Behavior Model with Previous Models
Observation 2.1. When XU > 2, the following order of prices holds: pMYS < pSTS <
pST < pMY , and these prices increase with XU (see Figure 2.7b).
When guests are strategic, the hotel cannot use a “high premium price - deep
discount” policy as in the myopic case. The premium room differential and the
standby upgrade price should be comparable so that the standby upgrades do not
fully cannibalize the premium room bookings and the hotel can still price discriminate
between the high and medium valuation guests.
Finally, Observation 2 suggests a counterintuitive way the hotel can price discrim-
inate:
Observation 2.2. When 2 < XU ≤ 6, the following order of prices holds: pSTS <
pST < pNS.
In contrast to our base model where the optimal policy is to increase the premium
room differential and offer an aggressive discount for the standby upgrades with
the introduction of standby upgrade program, this observation shows that the hotel
should actually decrease the premium room differential and offer a smaller discount
for the standby upgrades when guests are strategic.
2.5 Cost of Misspecifying Guest Behavior
All the models discussed so far assume that the hotel can correctly identify the type
of guest behavior. In this section, we analyze the consequences of making incorrect
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assumptions on the type of guest behavior. In doing so, we follow the literature by
calculating the cost penalty of a hotel assuming myopic customers when the guests
are actually strategic (Aviv and Pazgal, 2008; Zhang and Cooper, 2008; Mersereau
and Zhang, 2012). Our discussions with our hotel chain partner also revealed that
the property managers might be unjustifiably worried about strategic behavior (at
least according to the central revenue management team), which causes suspicions
about projected benefits of offering standby upgrade programs based solely on a
myopic guests assumption. In response to these erns, we add a new dimension to this
common robustness test by analyzing the reverse scenario, where the hotel assumes
that guests are strategic when they are actually myopic.
2.5.1 Incorrect Assumption 1: Assuming Myopic Behavior when Guests are
Strategic
Consider a hotel using (pMYS , pMY ) when the guests are actually strategic. Denote
the expected revenue in this case as ΠMY (ST ). The following result explains the
consequences of this error:
Proposition 2.4. If the hotel uses the optimal price set for myopic guests when the
guests are strategic, standby upgrades fully cannibalize the premium room bookings.
In this case, using standby upgrades hurts revenues as compared to the no-standby-
upgrade benchmark
(
ΠNS > ΠMY (ST )
)
.
Proposition 2.4 states that when strategic guests observe a high premium room
differential but a deeply discounted standby upgrade price, they all choose the standby
upgrade option. When all guests choose standby upgrades, the resulting expected
revenue is lower than the optimal expected revenue of the benchmark model with no
standby upgrades, since pMYS is suboptimal for this model. We measure the revenue
loss by using the metric ΠMY (ST )−ΠNSΠNS and see that it is between 6% and 11% (for
XU ≤ 6; see Figure 2.8a). Thus, hotels should be aware of the risks of ignoring
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strategic behavior and use the standby upgrade program cautiously if such a scenario
is possible.
2.5.2 Incorrect Assumption 2: Assuming Strategic Behavior when Guests
are Myopic
Consider a hotel using (pSTS , pST ) when the guests are actually myopic. Denote the
expected revenue in this case as ΠST (MY ). For a given price set (p, pS), myopic
behavior always leads to a higher expected revenue than strategic behavior since
z > p. Therefore, the hotel’s resulting expected revenue in this case will be higher
than what the hotel expects to achieve
(
ΠST (MY ) > ΠST
)
. While the hotel may
believe that the standby upgrades bring additional revenue, the benefits could have
been higher had the hotel chosen the price set (pMYS , pMY ) as that would have led to
the optimal expected revenue ΠMY under myopic guest behavior. Our analysis shows
that the revenue impact of this mistake (i.e., ΠST (MY )−ΠMYΠMY ) ranges from 10% to 25%
(for XU ≤ 6; see Figure 2.8b).
In this scenario, the standby upgrade program still brings additional revenue,
since ΠST (MY ) > ΠST ≥ ΠNS. However, the incorrect assumption has a significant
negative effect since it prevents the hotel from fully taking advantage of its price
discrimination opportunities. The consequences of both incorrect assumptions show
us the importance of correctly identifying the guest behavior.
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2.6 Conclusions
The question of how to best manage upsell opportunities for premium rooms at
hotels has received little attention in the revenue management literature. While
many hotel chains use sophisticated standard room pricing techniques, they simply
add a fixed differential to the standard room price for setting premium room prices,
and sometimes offer discounted upgrades at the time of check-in. A recent innovative
approach aimed at improving the management of room upsell opportunities is Nor1’s
standby upgrade program, where discounted availability-based upgrades are offered
to guests who book standard rooms and guests are only charged for the upgrade if
the premium room is available once they arrive. In the current implementation of
this program, however, the list price of the premium room differential remains the
same as under the pre-Nor1 system.
In this paper, we offer an approach for simultaneously setting the price differential
and standby upgrade price from a standard room to a premium room, based on the
expected market size for premium rooms. To do so, we develop a model similar to the
pre-announced pricing models used in the markdown pricing literature with necessary
adjustments to capture the key characteristics of hotel standby upgrade programs.
This allows us to answer our main research question:
Which hotel properties benefit the most from offering standby upgrades? The rela-
tive premium room capacity (premium-to-standard room capacity ratio) and the type
of customer base (myopic versus strategic) are the two key factors that affect the po-
tential revenue improvement provided by offering standby upgrades. Our analysis of
booking data for our hotel chain partner’s 54 US properties shows that the relative
premium room capacity can be attributed to the hotel’s location and brand. Particu-
larly, upscale hotels with differentiated rooms (e.g., city/mountain/ocean/lake/river
views, higher floor, corner/tower rooms, additional bed) have a higher premium-to-
standard room capacity ratio (30% to 60% of the total number of standard rooms),
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which leads to a lower upper bound for the premium roommarket size in our model. In
contrast, upscale hotels with mostly standard rooms and a low premium-to-standard
room capacity ratio (less than 15%) have a higher upper bound for the premium room
market size. Midmarket hotels have a higher ratio of suites (generally 15% to 30%)
compared to upscale hotels with mostly standard rooms. Some midmarket resort ho-
tels have an even higher ratio of suites (40% to 50%, since these hotels mainly cater
to larger families).
Similarly, the type of customer base (myopic versus strategic) can be attributed
to the percentage of guests at a hotel property who are repeat customers since only
repeat customers can develop a sense of the chances of being awarded a standby up-
grade (a requirement for strategic behavior). Since our data does not contain any
customer specific identifiers, we use the loyalty status of a customer as a proxy for
repeat customers. Our analysis shows that airport hotels and hotels that primar-
ily serve business customers near central business locations are more likely to have
repeat guests (usually 55% to 65% of the customer base are loyalty guests at these
hotels). Consequently, these hotels face a higher probability of strategic guest behav-
ior than touristic downtown, resort, and roadside/small city hotels whose customers
are primarily one-and-done leisure customers (only 30% to 40% loyalty guests).
Based on the reasoning described above, our analysis indicates that standby up-
grade programs are more beneficial for hotels that serve non-repeat guests (see Figure
2.9). Moreover, assuming an industry average occupancy rate, mid-market resorts and
upscale leisure hotels with higher premium-to-standard room capacity ratios in this
group are expected to benefit more from standby upgrades. In contrast, the large
premium-to-standard room capacity ratios at upscale airport or business-oriented
hotels with many differentiated rooms may actually decrease the attractiveness of
offering standby upgrades since the customer base is more likely to consist of strate-
gic customers, who recognize the higher likelihood of being awarded a standby up-
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Figure 2.9 Benefits of Offering Standby Upgrades based on Market Size and
Guest Behavior
grade, resulting in the cannibalization of direct sales of the premium rooms. On
the other hand, the likelihood of being awarded a standby upgrade is lower in the
upscale hotels with a lower premium-to-standard room capacity ratio, which makes
standby upgrades beneficial even if the customer base consists of strategic customers.
Thus, for hotels that cater to non-repeating (leisure) customers, standby upgrades
are most attractive to upscale hotels and midmarket resort hotels with a higher
premium-to-standard room capacity ratio. In contrast, for hotels that cater to repeat
(business) customers, standby upgrades are most attractive to upscale hotels with a
lower premium-to-standard room capacity ratio. Compared to upscale hotels with
mostly standard rooms, standby upgrades always appear to be beneficial for midmar-
ket hotels that primarily serve the leisure market. The exception is midmarket hotels
near airports or major business locations, where a closer analysis of strategic guest
behavior is required.
Beyond these general guidelines, our research provides the following additional
insights on standby upgrade programs:
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Differentiating standard rooms can bring additional benefits to hotels using standby
upgrade programs. Our results indicate that standby upgrades are especially powerful
when XU is low (i.e. the hotel has high premium-to-standard room capacity) and
guests are myopic. Based on this finding, we suggest that the hoteliers look for new
and innovative ways of differentiating their standard rooms (e.g. higher floor, corner
room, balcony). Doing this in the absence of offering standby upgrades may bring the
hotel additional revenue but, by adding standby upgrades into their toolset, revenues
can be significantly improved through further price discrimination and better overall
capacity management.
Hotels should update their premium room differential when using a standby upgrade
program. When properties included in our partner’s data set began using standby up-
grade programs, they continued to use the same fixed premium room price differential
that was used before the program was introduced. Our results indicate that updating
the premium room differential with the introduction of a standby upgrade program
can significantly increase revenue for the hotel. Furthermore, the hotel should adjust
its prices according to the target occupancy rates, which may be different for different
days of stay.
Replacing front-desk upsells with standby upgrade programs can be beneficial for
hotels. The advantage of a front-desk upsell program is that the market size is revealed
by the time an upsell offer is made, and the hotel can set the optimal upgrade price
using full information on the market size. However, inconsistent performance of
the front-desk upsell program (i.e., not having a chance to offer upgrades due to a
long check-in line) sometimes preclude the hotels from adjusting their premium room
differentials with the consideration of front-desk upselling. In such cases, our results
show that the benefit from offering standby upgrades is higher than the benefit of
front-desk upsells.
Standby upgrade programs can provide additional benefits when standard rooms
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are overbooked. When there is a special event at a hotel, such as a convention,
the hotel may choose to overbook their standard rooms. If the hotel does not use
standby upgrades, it typically has to offer free premium room upgrades to satisfy
the excess standard room demand. Our analysis shows that using standby upgrades
in these situations not only helps the hotel to price discriminate its customers, but
also brings additional revenue from the rooms which are normally upgraded for free.
Thus, offering standby upgrades becomes even more valuable for a hotel that satisfies
overbooked standard room demand with free premium room upgrades.
Correctly identifying guest behavior and adjusting prices accordingly has a signif-
icant impact on the resulting revenues. A standby upgrade program provides a hotel
with an additional way to price discriminate between guests with high and low valu-
ations for the premium room differential. When guests are myopic, the hotel can use
a higher premium room differential and a deeply discounted standby upgrade price.
However, when guests are strategic, the hotel should factor in the cannibalization
threat and price accordingly, leading to a smaller gap between the premium room
differential and the standby upgrade price. Misidentifying strategic guests as myopic,
or myopic guests as strategic, can lead to significant implications on the hotel’s rev-
enue. For example, our results suggest that an upscale hotel next to a convention
center in a major business city should alternate between different pricing policies.
When there is an event in the conference center, the hotel can assume that the num-
ber of repeat guests will be low and price according to myopic guest behavior. In
contrast, when there is no event, most of the guests may be regular business cus-
tomers who return frequently, so the hotel should price according to strategic guest
behavior. Using the same pricing policy with standby upgrades for all circumstances
could potentially result in an overall revenue loss for a hotel property.
We believe that standby upgrades is a promising area for future research, and may
have new areas of application outside of the hospitality domain in the near future. In
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fact, some airlines have already started using similar programs. This paper has taken
an early attempt to examine the benefits of such upgrades analytically and suggest
potential improvements. Availability of data on guests’ decisions also makes this area
a good candidate for empirical research on the guest decision making process.
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Chapter 3
Investigating Strategic Customer Behavior
For Hotel Standby Upgrades
3.1 Introduction
Traditional revenue management practices in airline and hotel industries use capacity
control mechanisms (i.e., controlling the sale of different fare classes on a single leg
of an airline and the sale of hotel rooms for a given date at different rate classes),
which often leads to high prices for closer periods to the time of consumption, since
customers arriving in these periods are relatively price-insensitive business travelers
(Schwartz, 2000; Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2006). On the other hand, any unsold capac-
ity at the time of consumption results in zero revenue. Therefore, if the inventory is
not selling at the expected rates, airlines and hotels offer their inventory at a discount,
frequently referred to as last-minute deals (Ovchinnikov and Milner, 2012).
Although last-minute efforts could generate significant revenue from the distressed
inventory, revenue management teams of airline or hotels are often forced to police
their policies against last-minute discounting efforts by other parts of the organiza-
tion that may have more myopic views about maximizing revenues1 (i.e., ignore the
possibility that some high-price customers who would book anyway would shift to
last-minute deals in long-term). The main reason for this is that a significant portion
of customers can act strategic even facing sophisticated airline or hotel pricing algo-
1Li et al. (2014) suggest that using a non-decreasing pricing scheme may bring up to 8% revenue
improvement while facing strategic customers, in contrast to existing end-of-season discounts in the
retail industry.
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rithms. In fact, Li et al. (2014) show that 5% to 20% of travelers are strategic across
different markets for airline fares.
A recent compromise strategy between these two opposing views has been to offer
upgrade-eligible fares or standby upgrades, where the premium product capacity is
used as a buffer for regular product demand (Biyalogorsky et al., 2005; Cui, 2015;
Yılmaz et al., 2017). In particular, upgrade-eligible fares of airlines give customers a
chance to get a first class seat with a higher price economy ticket provided that space
is available. Nor1’s eStandby R© upgrades2, which has recently been adopted by most
hotel chains and major regional/individual hotels, offer discounted, availability-based
upgrades to customers. While both standby upgrades and upgradeable airline tickets
typically offer a discounted premium capacity, they differ in (i) that standby upgrades
are only offered for customers who have already booked standard rooms and (ii) that
customers only pay if the upgrade is awarded.
These practices increase the number of paths to reach a specific flight seat or hotel
room, therefore adding another dimension to a customer’s decision-making. In addi-
tion, the probabilistic nature of these products make it important to understand the
customers’ decision-making dynamics in order to adopt the correct pricing strate-
gies, since suboptimal pricing decisions, such as ignoring the strategic behavior or
assuming that customers are strategic in settings where they are myopic, may have
significant revenue implications (Yılmaz et al., 2017).
Academic interest in investigating the benefits of innovative revenue management
practices with probabilistic elements3 has been growing, although currently the aca-
demic literature lacks any empirical studies on the type of customer behavior in
different airline and hotel settings with probabilistic products. Despite this, most
of the recent analytical work in this area assumes that customers are strategic and
2Full details on how program works can be found in §3.3.
3Popular examples are opaque selling tools such Hotwire’s Hot Rate R© Hotels and Priceline’s
Name Your Own Price R©.
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will always choose the expected-utility maximizing option. We postulate that not all
customers are strategic. Instead, some customers may not be aware of these prod-
ucts or may not be inclined to reason through complex options based on probabilities
and prices while making their decision. To the best of our knowledge, this paper
represents the first attempt to empirically investigate the existence and the extent of
strategic customers in a probabilistic product setting. In a standby upgrade setting,
we define strategic customers as those who are savvy enough to initially choose a
standard room over a premium room with the expectation of being offered a dis-
counted premium room through standby upgrades. Yılmaz et al. (2017) show that
it is rational for a strategic customer to do so, thus the absence of this action is an
indicator of non-strategic behavior.
In order to investigate for strategic behavior, we utilize a major hotel chain’s
16-month booking and standby upgrades data over a set of properties. We set out
two main research goals: First, we seek to understand customer decision-making
dynamics in the presence of standby upgrade programs and estimate the percentage
of strategic customers. Second, we seek to identify hotel and upgrade characteristics
that are more or less likely to observe strategic customer behavior.
Assuming that non-repeat customers with no loyalty program membership are
an “uncontaminated” sample due to their possible lack of awareness for standby up-
grades, we use these customers as a referencemyopic group through all of our analysis.
We first run a reduced-form model (a sequential application of the traditional logit
model because of the step-by-step nature of decision-making) to understand the dif-
ferences between non-repeat customers and repeat customers with loyalty program
memberships, who are more likely to be aware of the standby upgrade program and
may act strategic during the booking process.4 Then, we use Maximum Likelihood
4A strategic customer would always join the hotel’s loyalty program, because joining is free and
there are only positive benefits.
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Myopic (uncontaminated) Myopic + Strategic
Non-loyalty (Non-repeat) Loyalty (Repeat)
Figure 3.1 Postulated Behaviors for Non-loyalty and Loyalty Groups
Estimation (MLE) techniques to estimate an actual percentage of the non-myopic5
customers within the loyalty program members and test if this group is actually
strategic (see Figure 3.1 for a representation of the customer population if the test
provides evidence for strategic behavior).
We find evidence for strategic behavior in three (out of 8) hotel properties that
we study. Our estimation results suggest that 22% to 42% of the loyalty program
members (10% to 22% of the total customers) are strategic in these upper mid-scale
brand properties near major expressways or business areas. On the other hand, we
cannot find any evidence for strategic behavior in other properties, upper midscale
or upscale hotels near attractions (e.g., golf course, theme park), and upper midscale
hotels near convention centers and hospital complexes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section reviews
related work and positions our contribution to the empirical literature on the existence
and the extent of strategic behavior. §3.3 briefly discusses the heterogeneity in the
decision-making process for different types of customers. §3.4 provides the details
5We do not force the condition of being strategic for the customers in this group, i.e., they may
not show characteristics set by a strategic behavior model.
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of our data. §3.5 explains our reduced-form analysis and preliminary results. §3.6
presents our MLE analysis and main results. §3.7 concludes with the limitations and
future work.
3.2 Literature Review
In the operations management literature, strategic customer behavior, in particular,
strategic timing of a purchase, has been extensively investigated through analytical
models for different settings such as pre-announced discounts, contingent discounts,
capacity rationing, and reservations. Optimal pricing policies for a firm facing strate-
gic customers and negative consequences of ignoring such behavior have also been
examined in detail (for a review, see Netessine and Tang, 2009). Most of this work
makes the assumption that customer population is fully strategic. Although this as-
sumption may hold for the retail industry where customers can make sophisticated
decisions because of the availability of historical data, it is not clear whether it may
hold in a hospitality setting, especially for a program as recent as standby upgrades.
Thus, it is important to investigate the existence and extent of the strategic behavior
in the standby upgrades context.
In the economics and marketing literature, there is a stream of research that
takes strategic behavior into account in empirical models. Erdem and Keane (1996)
model customer behavior in an environment when there is uncertainty about brand
attributes. They compare a dynamic model with immediate utility maximizing cus-
tomers and a dynamic model with forward-looking customers who maximize the ex-
pected present value. They estimate the likelihood functions for these models using
Nielsen scanner data for detergent. Nair (2007) provides a framework to investigate
the optimal pricing for strategic customers with an empirical study in the market
for video-games in the US. These two papers are based on the assumption that the
customers are forward-looking. On the contrary, Chevalier and Goolsbee (2009) test
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whether textbook customers are forward-looking by using a large data set on text-
books sold in college bookstores and find evidence of the forward-looking behavior.
Additionally, Hendel and Nevo (2013) estimate the fraction of customers, who can
store for future consumption needs, at a market level using the sales data of two-liter
bottles of Coke, Pepsi, and store brands. Through different behavioral models, they
show that 59% to 90% of the customers are storers.6
On the other hand, very little research provides evidence for strategic customer
behavior in the operations management literature. Li et al. (2014) use a structural
model to estimate the fraction of strategic customers by using airline fares and book-
ing data and show that 5.2% to 19.2% of the customers act strategic. Through a lab
experiment, Osadchiy and Bendoly (2015) provide insights for the forward-looking
nature of decision-makers faced with buy-now vs. buy-later decisions and how de-
pendent that nature is on the presence of information regarding future product avail-
ability. Their results show that 77% of subjects are forward-looking, and 36% of them
correctly perceive the future availability risk. In our setting with standby upgrades,
the form of strategic behavior is significantly different: Customers do not strategize
the time of their purchase, instead they have an option to request a standby upgrade
at a discounted rate and get a premium room only if it is available at the time of
check-in. Therefore, the strategic behavior is in the choice rather than timing.
Our paper is based on the connection between the loyalty status and customer
behavior. The marketing literature defines loyalty as an irrational and emotional
attachment to a product, service, or business (Taylor et al., 2004). To the best of
our knowledge, Meyer-Waarden (2008) is the only empirical work on the relationship
between loyalty programs and customers’ purchases. Using a supermarket scanner
data, the author shows that purchase intensity and frequency of cardholders is sig-
6Note that these papers focus on different forms of strategic behavior, compared to the operations
management literature.
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nificantly higher than that of non-members. Shugan et al. (2005), on the other hand,
claims that many so-called loyalty programs are shams because they produce liabili-
ties (e.g. promises of future rewards) rather than assets. Related to this discussion,
we provide mixed results for hotel standby upgrades: We show that the loyalty cus-
tomers have a higher willingness-to-pay for a premium room in some hotels, but may
act strategic (and partially cannibalize the premium room bookings) in others. Our
findings for different hotels provide evidence supporting both arguments, and show
the importance of identifying the type of customers that a hotel property has.
Dealing with supply and demand mismatch through upgrades has been recently
gaining interest in the operations management literature. Gallego and Stefanescu
(2009) and Yu et al. (2015) work on the capacity management problem with such
upgrades. Cui (2015) show that the probabilistic element of standby upgrade program
can be used as a price correction mechanism in the presence of strategic customers
when the hotel is a price taker for standard and premium room prices. Yılmaz et al.
(2017), on the other hand, provide insights about how to optimally price standby
upgrades and premium room prices to price discriminate while facing different types of
customer behavior.7 The authors also measure the negative consequences of ignoring
the strategic behavior and the lost opportunity in case of assuming customers are
strategic when they are actually myopic.
Discussions with our hotel chain partner’s central revenue management team re-
vealed that property managers are overly concerned about the customer behavior
when using standby upgrades. In particular, they do not have a means for estimat-
ing the percentage of strategic customers and are confused about the correct pricing
strategy. This paper aims to take a first step toward filling this gap by empirically
7They show that the hotels observing myopic behavior can use standby upgrades as an aggressive
price discrimination tool by setting a higher premium room price and applying a deep discount for
the standby upgrades. On the other hand, the hotels observing strategic behavior can continue
using their current premium room price and apply a mild discount for standby upgrades.
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Figure 3.2 Reservation Confirmation Window Showing
that Standby Upgrades are Available
investigating the existence and the extent of strategic behavior for different hotel
environments. Our methodology and empirical results, connected with analytical re-
sults of Yılmaz et al. (2017), provide guidance for hoteliers to use standby upgrade
programs more effectively based on the hotel type and customer behavior.
3.3 Behavioral Models for Customers’ Decision-Making Process
In this section, we focus on the customer decision-making process through an ana-
lytical explanation. Before going into details, let us present how standby upgrade
program works in detail:
The guest (she) first makes a choice between booking a standard room and pre-
mium room (or do not purchase). When she completes the reservation, she receives
a banner ad indicating that customized upgrade offers are available via email or on
brand.com confirmation page (see Figure 3.2). After clicking the banner ad, she re-
ceives a list of discounted upgrade offers (see Figure 3.3). These offers include room
upgrades (e.g. standard guestroom to a suite), room features (e.g. city view), ameni-
ties (e.g. internet), early check-in/late check-out, parking, spa services, etc. If she
requests an upgrade, she learns whether the upgrade(s) is awarded at the time of
check-in. If awarded, she is automatically charged the discounted price, otherwise
she keeps the original booking and pays nothing extra.
For simplicity, consider a hotel with one standard and one premium room type. A
customer makes a set of decisions based on her valuation for the standard room and
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Figure 3.3 Standby Upgrade Offers
premium room, the standard and premium room prices, her awareness of standby up-
grades, and the standby upgrade price. Figure 3.4 illustrates this process. Following
Yılmaz et al. (2017), we approach this problem using the customer valuation for the
differential, i.e., the difference between her premium and standard room valuations,
instead of using a two-dimensional valuation for standard room and premium rooms.
We postulate that customers are heterogeneous in their valuations for the premium
room differential, and their loyalty status has a direct effect on their capabilities of
being strategic. The customers without loyalty membership are assumed to be non-
repeat customers, therefore not aware of standby upgrade programs. On the other
hand, loyalty program members are mainly repeat customers who potentially know
about the standby upgrade program based on their experience. Note that there are
some high-tier loyalty members who accumulate points above a certain threshold and
qualify for additional benefits such as free upgrades. Since these customers are not
targeted by standby upgrades, we only focus on the basic-tier loyalty customers in
this paper.
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Figure 3.4 Steps of Customer Decision-making Process
3.3.1 Customers with No Loyalty Program Membership
Customers with no loyalty membership are likely to be unaware of the standby up-
grade program prior to booking a room since most of them are not repeat customers.
Therefore, they are unlikely to act strategically: They make a decision between a
standard and premium room initially without considering the possibility of receiving
a standby upgrade offer after booking. If they book a standard room, they then make
a decision on the standby upgrade offer based on their valuation on the differential
between two rooms, v: For a price set8 (pS, p), a customer without loyalty member-
ship books the premium room initially if her valuation is v ≥ p. If v < p, she books
a standard room and sees the standby upgrade offer. If v ∈ [pS, p), she accepts the
offer, otherwise she rejects.9
8Today, most hotels use state-of-the-art tools to price their standard rooms. On the other hand,
they use a fixed premium differential, p, and standby upgrade price, pS , pegged to standard room
price.
9Our data shows that some of these customers do not click the banner ad. They may be missing
the banner ad, or may have very low valuations for standby upgrades and do not want to see the
offer. We cannot distinguish between customers who do not see the offer and who do see the offer
but have low valuations.
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We use the group of customers without loyalty membership as an uncontaminated
myopic reference group in our analysis for investigating the strategic behavior of
customers with loyalty memberships.
3.3.2 Loyalty Program Members
Our data set shows the award rate, i.e., the likelihood of getting a premium room
through standby upgrades, for customers requesting the standby upgrade offers as
around 50%. We postulate that at least a portion of loyalty program members may
be aware of this high award rate and choose to opt for a standby upgrade offer even if
they have high valuations for the differential and would, in the absence of a standby
upgrade program, book a premium room directly.
Consider such a customer with a belief on award rate, r′ ∈ [0, 1]. There exist two
threshold values for this customer at a given r′: (i) The indifference point between
keeping the standard room and requesting standby upgrade, v1 = pS. (ii) The in-
difference point between requesting standby upgrade and booking a premium room,
v2 = p−r
′pS
1−r′ . Thus, for a price set (pS, p), a strategic customer books the premium
room initially if her valuation is v ≥ v2. If v ∈ [v1, v2), she books a standard room
and chooses the standby upgrade offer. Otherwise, she books a standard room and
rejects the offer. Note that v2 = ∞ if r′ = 1. Figure 3.5 illustrates the utility-
maximizing actions for a strategic customer on an example with r′ ∈ [0, 1], v ∈ [0, 1]
and (pS, p) = (0.5, 0.7).
Given our explanations, we expect strategic customers to be less likely to book
premium rooms at the onset, but more likely to click the banner ad to see the standby
upgrade offers compared to myopic customers. We also expect these customers to be
more likely to request an upgrade.10
10We assume that customers who consider standby upgrades do not differ in their valuations for
the differential based on their type, myopic or strategic.
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Figure 3.5 Optimal Actions for a Strategic Customer based on v and r′
3.4 Data
The data for this study is from a major hotel chain (with more than 100 properties
in the United States). The data set contains reservation information and standby
upgrade decisions of customers over 16 months between January 2013 and April
2014.
Booking data:
The booking data contains complete reservation information except for the name of
the customer: Hotel brand, property name, reservation number, booking date, arrival
and departure dates, rate code, booked room type, booked room rate, loyalty status,
exposure to the standby upgrade.
Standby upgrade data:
For each customer who completed the booking process and received the banner ad,
the standby upgrade data set contains: the action on the banner ad (clicked or not); if
clicked then the date of the click, standby upgrade offers presented with information
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Hotel ID Book Arrive Depart Room Rate Loyalty Banner Standby Price Offer Request
CHI 1 1-3-13 1-3-13 2-3-13 STD 89 1 1 PRE 20 8 0
CHI 2 2-2-13 1-3-13 3-3-13 STD 89 0 1 PRE 20 10 1
CHI 3 1-2-13 1-3-13 2-3-13 PRE 109 1 - - - - -
CHI 4 1-3-13 1-3-13 2-3-13 STD 89 1 0 - - - -
CHI 5 11-3-13 1-3-13 3-3-13 STD 89 0 1 PRE 20 12 0
CHI 6 1-2-13 1-3-13 2-3-13 STD 89 1 0 - - - -
CHI 7 1-2-13 1-3-13 2-3-13 PRE 109 0 - - - - -
Figure 3.6 A Snapshot of the Final Data Set
on the type of the offer (room upgrades, amenity, parking etc.), actual price of the offer
(p), discounted price of the offer (pS), the customer’s action on the offer (requested
or not), and if requested, then the outcome (awarded by the hotel or not).
3.4.1 Data Preparation
We integrate the two main data sets mentioned above with our hotel chain’s property
database and room type mapping. We remove standby upgrade offers for ancillary
products, since these often have unconstrained capacity. In addition, the decision-
making process becomes much more complex when there are more than a single
room upgrade, therefore we only focus on the hotels with two main room types, one
standard and one premium.11 As a result, we use a subset of 8 hotel properties for
our data set, resulting in 15,222 bookings. A snapshot of the final data set is given
in Figure 3.6.12
11Some hotels in the final data set have more than two room types. For these hotels, we omit
the luxury upgrades (e.g., presidential suite) which are extremely rarely requested and also have a
very low likelihood of being awarded. Following Yılmaz et al. (2017), we focus on incremental room
upgrades (e.g., mountain view room, a standard suite).
12As mentioned earlier, we only focus on basic-tier loyalty customers, therefore we dropped all
customers with high-tier loyalty status.
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Table 3.1 Variable Descriptions
Names Definitions Detail
LOS Length-of-stay Min(DepartureDate−ArrivalDate, 3)
ADV Advanced-booking time 0 if booked within last week, 1 if 7 to 13
days, 2 if 14 to 20 days, 3 o.w.
SAT Saturday-night-stay 1 if stay includes Saturday night, 0 o.w.
LOYAL Loyalty membership 1 if loyalty program member, 0 o.w.
PRICE Standby upgrade price Discounted offer price
Premium Initial booking choice 1 if premium room, 0 o.w.
Interest Interest on the banner ad 1 if clicked, 0 o.w.
Upgrade Action on standby upgrade 1 if requested, 0 o.w.
Because of the sequential nature of the decision-making process, we create three
data sets from the resulting data set: The first data set (DS1) contains the initial
decision of the customers, i.e., whether they book a standard room or a premium
room. The second data set (DS2) has the customers’ action on the banner ad, i.e.,
whether they click the banner ad or not. Note that customers who initially choose
a premium room (e.g., customers #3 and #7 in Figure 3.6) are not in this data set,
because they would not see a room upgrade offer in the standby upgrade list. The
final data set (DS3) is for the standby upgrade decision, i.e., whether they request
the offer or not, and it only includes the customers who clicked the banner ad (e.g.,
customers #1, #2, and #5 in Figure 3.6).
3.4.2 Variables
Table 3.1 presents our independent variables that are expected to influence customers’
decision-making, and dependent variables that represent customers’ sequential deci-
sions. Note that for the length-of-stay variable, we categorize bookings as one-night,
two-night and 3+ night stays. For the advanced-booking time variable, we categorize
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Table 3.2 Statistical Summary
Values Between-hotel variation
Names 0 1 2 3 Min-Max Std.Dev.
LOS - 60.3% 22.1% 17.6% 35.8% - 88.6% 16.1%
ADV 46.9% 15.7% 8.7% 28.7% 39.0% - 59.3% 7.2%
SAT 62.9% 37.1% - - 48.7% - 72.8% 7.1%
LOYAL 46.8% 49.9% - - 30.3% - 67.7% 12.2%
Premium 76.3% 23.7% - - 51.7% - 90.4% 13.0%
Interest 58.5% 39.9% - - 52.6% - 66.3% 4.8%
Upgrade 82.8% 17.2% - - 70.8% - 87.0% 5.1%
bookings as within one-week, one-to-two-weeks, two-to-three-weeks, and 3+ weeks
from the arrival date (instead of using a continuous booking time variable).
The basic composition of the customer base can be seen in Table 3.2. For each
variable, we present the percentages for each value in the entire customer population
at the left hand side. In order to show the between-hotel variation, we share the
min-max range and the standard deviation information.13 For example, 62.9% of the
entire population are customers who did not include Saturday in their bookings. This
number is as low as 48.7% in hotel property A and as high as 72.8% in hotel property
D, with a standard deviation of 7.1%. Note that the statistics related to Interest and
Upgrade are based on DS2 (customers who booked a standard room initially) and
DS3 (customers who clicked on the banner ad), respectively.
13For variables with more than two possible values (LOS and ADV ), we share the between-hotel
variation information with respect to the reference value (1 for LOS and 0 for ADV ).
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3.5 Reduced-Form Analysis: Sequential Logit Model
3.5.1 Model Discussion
While a Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) with a choice set of premium room, standby
upgrade and standard room is one option to investigate the existence of loyalty cus-
tomers’ strategic behavior, we choose a model which accounts for the fact that de-
cisions are made in a sequence of stages. We estimate the effect of loyalty status
on decision-making using a Sequential Logit Model (Tutz, 1991), i.e., a sequential
application of the traditional logit model. This model makes it easier to estimate
the effect of an independent variable across transitions. We use STATA 14 for our
analysis as follows:14
First, we estimate the coefficients for the initial booking decision using
log
(
pi
1− pi
)
= β10 + β1LLOY ALi + β1CCONTROLSi (3.1)
on DS1 where pi = Pr(Premiumi = 1|xi) for each customer i with regressors xi. Our
variable of interest is LOYAL, but we have a set of control variables: LOS, ADV, and
SAT.
Second, we estimate the coefficients for the action on the banner ad using
log
(
pi
1− pi
)
= β20 + β2LLOY ALi + β2CCONTROLSi (3.2)
on DS2 where pi = Pr(Interesti = 1|xi) for each customer i. Our variable of interest
and the set of control variables are same.
Finally, we estimate the coefficients for the standby upgrade request using
log
(
pi
1− pi
)
= β30 + β3LLOY ALi + β3pricePRICEi + β3CCONTROLSi (3.3)
on DS3 where pi = Pr(Upgradei = 1|xi) for each customer i. Given that Nor1
offers the same standby upgrade for different prices to different customers and the
14Note that we do this analysis for each hotel separately.
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customers see the price as they make their decision at this stage, we add PRICE as
an independent variable.
3.5.2 Preliminary Results
Our estimations provide coefficients for loyalty status in each step of the decision-
making for each hotel. We observe three main patterns for the loyalty coefficients of
each step: In the first group of hotels (2 out of 8), we find that loyalty customers are
more likely to book premium rooms initially (β1L > 0), more likely to click the banner
ad (β2L > 0) and more likely to request an upgrade (β3L > 0). This suggests that the
loyalty customers in these hotels have a higher valuation for the premium rooms.15
In the second group of hotels (3 out of 8), we find that loyalty customers are only
more likely to click the banner ad (β2L > 0), which suggests higher awareness of the
standby upgrade program. Finally, in the third group of hotels (3 out of 8), we see
that loyalty customers are less likely to book premium rooms initially (β1L < 0), but
more likely to click the banner ad (β2L > 0) and more likely to request an upgrade
(β3L > 0).16 These coefficients are consistent with our expectations for the strategic
customer behavior. In Table 3.3, we report the loyalty coefficients (for the three
steps) and price coefficients (only for the last step) for three representative hotels,
each following a different pattern.
In summary, our reduced-form analysis shows that loyalty membership does ap-
pear to have an effect on the decision-making, but this effect is not consistent across
all hotels. In addition, we assume a fixed loyalty effect in this analysis, however it
is not clear whether the loyalty membership has an effect on all loyalty customers,
therefore we take a detailed look in the loyalty customers’ behavior in the next section.
15Remember that our analytical explanation was based on the assumption that customers who
consider standby upgrades do not differ in their valuations for the differential based on their type,
myopic or strategic.
16Note that PRICE has a negative coefficient (which is statistically significant except for two of
the properties) in each hotel as one can expect.
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Table 3.3 Sequential Logit Results for Three Example Hotels
Hotel B Hotel D Hotel F
β1L 0.193∗∗ -0.169 -0.258∗∗
β2L 0.495∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗
β3L 0.423∗∗ 0.148 0.877∗
β3price -0.187∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗
*: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01
3.6 Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Percentage of Strategic
Customers
3.6.1 Model Discussion
While it is interesting to know that some customers may act strategically, it is perhaps
more useful to know what percentage of customers do so. Therefore, we take another
step and use a Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) approach to estimate the
actual percentage of strategic customers in the loyalty member population, based
on the assumption that this group is a combination of both myopic and strategic
customers. We use the ml routine in STATA 14 for the analysis.
We start with the assumption that α percentage of loyalty members are non-
myopic.17 An important challenge here is that we have three decision-making steps,
but we need a single α value to represent the non-myopic group. In other words, we
need a procedure which can combine all three steps into one and estimate a single α.
Therefore, we take the following approach:
1. We use the sequential logit model shown in (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) only on the
non-loyalty group to estimate three sets of coefficients βˆ = [βˆ1βˆ2βˆ3] for the
set of control variables (LOS, ADV, SAT for each step, and PRICE only for
17We do not force the condition of being strategic.
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the last step). Note that we do not estimate a coefficient for loyalty, since all
customers in this group are customers without loyalty program membership.
2. Using the sets of estimated coefficients βˆ in Step 1, we find the predicted con-
ditional probabilities pˆik for each customer in the loyalty group for each step
k = 1, 2, 3. Given the step-by-step nature of the decision-making, we focus on
the probabilities for a customer at a specific step. For example, pˆi2 represents
the probability of a customer clicking on the banner ad given that she chooses a
standard room at the onset. Note that these probabilities represent the scenario
where all loyalty members are myopic.
3. We define four possible decision paths for a customer, j: (1) booking a premium
room, (2) booking a standard room, but not clicking the banner ad, (3) booking
a standard room and clicking the banner ad, but not requesting a standby
upgrade, and (4) booking a standard room and clicking the banner ad, also
requesting a standby upgrade. We calculate the predicted probabilities for each
decision path-customer combination (j = 1, 2, 3, 4), tˆij , using pˆik’s.
4. We estimate a single αˆ and three set of coefficients θˆ = [θˆ1θˆ2θˆ3], i.e., coef-
ficients for non-myopic loyalty members, for the same set of control variables
maximizing the log-likelihood function
lnL =
n∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
yijln[αFj(xi, θ) + (1− α)tˆij(xi, βˆ)] (3.4)
where yij represents the binary outcome for the decision path-customer combi-
nation (1 if realized, 0 otherwise), F (.) is the c.d.f. of the logistic distribution,
and xi is the set of regressors.
We now interpret αˆ as the proportion of non-myopic customers in the loyalty
member population, which is essentially the probability that a customer is non-
myopic.
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5. Using the new sets of estimated coefficients θˆ, we find the predicted conditional
probabilities qˆik for each customer in the loyalty group for each step k = 1, 2, 3.
In order to understand the differences between the two groups, we compare the
two set of predicted conditional probabilities: pˆik vs. qˆik.
Given the nature of our approach, our non-myopic group can be considered as a
group following a different behavior than the myopic group, which may or may not
be consistent with the strategic customer behavior described before. Therefore, we
call αˆ of loyalty members strategic only if the predicted conditional probabilities for
the non-myopic group (compared to the myopic group) follow the patterns expected
from strategic customers. The next section explains this process in detail.
3.6.2 Results
Using the model explained above, we estimate a single αˆ for each hotel in our data
set and calculate the predicted conditional probabilities for each loyalty member for
both scenarios, myopic and non-myopic. We use two statistics (for each step) to
make the comparison between the two sets of predicted probabilities: (i) the mean
of the difference between the predicted probabilities for the non-myopic group and
the myopic group, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 qˆik−pˆik
n
for k = 1, 2, 3 and (ii) the percentage of times the
probability for the non-myopic group is higher than the predicted probability for the
myopic group, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 1{qˆik>pˆik}
n
for k = 1, 2, 3.
We summarize the estimation results18 across different hotels in Table 3.4. For
hotels A, B, C, and H, we see that the non-myopic group is more likely to book
premium rooms initially (e.g., by 8% for Hotel B on average), more likely to click on
the banner ad (e.g., by 15.6% for Hotel B on average, given that the customer booked
a standard room) and more likely to request an upgrade (e.g., by 8.2% for Hotel B on
18We use the paired t-test to determine whether the mean of the differences between two samples
(non-myopic group and myopic group) differs from 0. We find strong evidence (p<0.001) that the
mean of the differences differs from 0 for each hotel.
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Table 3.4 Estimation Results for Strategic Behavior
∑n
i=1 qˆik−pˆik
n
∑n
i=1 1{qˆik>pˆik}
n
Hotel k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 αˆ Strategic?
A 4.54% 12.99% 7.20% 100% 100% 72.3% 100% No
B 7.99% 15.62% 8.17% 84.6% 96.9% 77.71% 67.6% No
C 5.79% 53.67% 25.02% 65.3% 100% 100% 26.1% No
D -0.72% 11.09% 2.26% 33.8% 89.4% 56.0% 100% Not clear
E -15.65% 9.00% 17.02% 18.6% 73.2% 69.2% 42.4% Yes
F -8.96% 43.34% 13.87% 15.5% 100% 80.2% 42.2% Yes
G -8.63% 36.70% 11.07% 20.8% 63.5% 58.6% 22.1% Yes
H 11.81% 33.93% 3.17% 55.7% 83.6% 55.5% 31.6% No
average, given that the customer clicked on the banner ad) compared to the myopic
group. This is not parallel to our expectations for strategic customers, therefore we
cannot call the non-myopic group strategic for these properties. These non-myopic
groups must be composed of customers who have a higher willingness-to-pay for the
premium rooms.
On the other hand, for hotels E, F, and G, we find out that the non-myopic
group is less likely to book a premium room at the onset (e.g., by 9% for Hotel F
on average), but more likely to click on the banner ad (e.g., by 43.3% for Hotel F
on average, given that the customer booked a standard room), and more likely to
request an upgrade (e.g., by 13.9% for Hotel F on average, given that the customer
clicked on the banner ad) compared to the myopic group. This is consistent with our
expectations for strategic behavior, providing evidence for strategic behavior in these
properties.
For hotel D, although statistics suggest the existence of strategic behavior (and
paired t-test supports this), the mean of the differences between non-myopic and
myopic groups is very small (0.7%) for the first step of the decision-making, which
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may be practically insignificant. In addition, αˆ is 100%, which makes us think that
a more detailed analysis is needed (potentially with more data).
3.7 Conclusions and Discussions
The academic interest in investigating customers’ strategic behavior, i.e., delaying a
purchase strategically anticipating that prices might decrease, has been growing. On
the other hand, recent probabilistic products in airline and hotel industries create op-
portunities for a new form of strategic behavior, i.e. choosing a probabilistic product
with an expectation of receiving a high-utility product, for travelers. One exam-
ple of a probabilistic product is Nor1’s standby upgrade program, where discounted
availability-based upgrades are offered to customers who book standard rooms and
customers are only charged for the upgrade if the premium room is available once
they arrive.
In this paper, we investigate the existence and extent of strategic behavior in
a hotel setting with standby upgrades. Based on the assumption that non-repeat
customers are unaware of these upgrades before the booking (i.e., they are myopic),
we investigate how loyalty program members, who are likely to be familiar with these
upgrades, make their decisions differently than non-repeat customers. We provide
evidence of strategic customer behavior, i.e., choosing a standard room initially and
requesting a standby upgrade with the expectation of receiving a premium room
through standby upgrades, in three out of 8 hotel properties. We obtain an estimate
of 10% to 22% of the customer population to consist of strategic customers (22%
to 42% of the loyalty program members) in these properties. On the other hand,
we show that loyalty program members in some other properties may actually have
higher willingness-to-pay for premium rooms, compared to customers with no loyalty
program membership.
Combining our empirical results with detailed information on the hotel properties,
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Table 3.5 Comparison of Customer Dynamics
All Loyalty Non-loyalty
E,F,G Other E,F,G Other E,F,G Other
LOS = 1 65.1% 53.2% 70.5% 57.2% 60.0% 48.6%
ADV = 0 49.1% 44.8% 48.2% 43.7% 50.0% 46.2%
SAT = 0 64.2% 60.5% 64.1% 63.4% 64.3% 57.2%
LOS = 1, ADV = 0, SAT = 0 27.1% 21.0% 28.2% 22.0% 26.0% 20.0%
LOS = 3, ADV = 4, SAT = 1 2.3% 6.3% 2.1% 5.7% 2.4% 7.0%
we provide two important insights for the hoteliers:
Strategic behavior is prevalent in the upper midscale hotels near major expressways
or business areas. According to STR reports, the largest chain scale in the United
States is made up of the upper-midscale segment (around 20% of all the hotel rooms),
i.e., reasonably-priced quality hotels located in major cities or suburban areas, often
near major expressways, business areas, shopping areas, and attractions.
Our data set includes seven of these upper midscale brand properties and one
upscale brand property. We find that loyalty program members staying in upper
midscale hotels near major expressways or business areas (properties E, F, and G
in our data) are more likely to be strategic, compared to loyalty program members
staying in upper midscale or upscale hotels near attractions (e.g. golf course, theme
park), and upper midscale hotels near convention centers and hospital complexes.
We next compare the customer dynamics for properties that exhibit strategic
behavior (properties E, F, G) with properties we cannot find evidence for strategic
behavior (“Other”).19 Table 3.5 provides important statistics for this comparison,
first for all customers, then for loyalty and non-loyalty customers.
We observe that hotels E, F, and G observe a higher percentage of shorter stays, a
higher percentage of customers booking within the last week, but a smaller percentage
19Hotel D is omitted in this analysis.
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of Saturday stays. Although the largest customer segment in all properties is the
customers who stay only one night, book within the last week and do not stay on
a Saturday night, hotels E, F, and G have significantly higher percentage of these
customers (%27.1) compared to other hotels (21.0%). On the other hand, we observe
a completely opposite scenario for one of the other major customer segments, i.e.,
customers who stay 3 or more nights, book in advance, and stay on a Saturday
night. The number for this segment is only 2.3% in hotels E, F, G, although it is
6.3% for the other hotels. Parallel to Yılmaz et al. (2017), these statistics show that
strategic customer behavior is prevalent in business-oriented hotels. Note that these
statistics are similar in both loyalty and non-loyalty groups, which suggests that the
main reason for the strategic behavior is not the differences between loyalty and
non-loyalty segments, but the differences in the customer dynamics.
Hotels should customize the premium room and standby upgrade prices. Hotels
have full control over the standby upgrade prices and also can offer discounts for
loyalty program members for premium rooms. Our methodology and results pro-
vide guidance to the hotel properties for a better pricing strategy, i.e., how to set
standby upgrade prices and when to offer discounts for the premium rooms. When
our methodology provides evidence for strategic behavior for a hotel property, a sim-
ple but efficient pricing strategy is to offer loyalty program members a discount for
the premium rooms, but keep their standby upgrade prices higher (Yılmaz et al.,
2017). In the extreme scenario, the hotel property may choose to offer individual
premium room and standby upgrade prices to their loyalty program members, based
on our model’s predicted probabilities.
Note that there are some limitations of our study which suggest future directions
to be explored. First, we only have a small set of properties in our complete data
set, because many properties offer more than one room upgrade to their customers.
Analyzing customers’ decision-making process becomes much more complex in this
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setting, i.e., requesting multiple room upgrades decreases the customer’s chance of
getting a specific type of room through standby upgrades compared to requesting a
single room upgrade (when both of the requested premium rooms are available at
the time of check-in, the hotel assigns one through the system without asking the
customer). A choice model considering this scenario may be a good addition to our
methodology. Second, we cannot enforce strategic behavior in our analysis, since
we do not have any information on the market competition and we do not consider
any capacity related issues because we only have booking information for the hotel
brand website. When such data is available, a model which takes the competition and
capacity (e.g., group bookings etc.) into account may offer an in-depth analysis for the
potential equilibrium between the actual award rates and customers’ beliefs. Third,
we only focus on the basic-tier loyalty customers in this paper, because high-tier
loyalty members may qualify for free upgrade eligibility. Although the literature on
the hotel and airline loyalty programs has been growing, we believe that an empirical
study using a similar data to ours may provide interesting insights on the differences
between basic-tier and high-tier loyalty customer decision-making.
69
Chapter 4
Team-specific Ticket Options
4.1 Introduction
The North American sports market was worth $60.5 billion in 2014. Gate revenues
is the industry’s largest segment, accounting for $17.7 billion. Revenue management
applications such as variable and dynamic pricing have gained popularity over the
last few years where most teams enjoy significant revenue improvements.1 These
applications help teams recapture their ticket value from secondary markets, which
is a $5 billion industry by itself.2
One reason that the secondary market for tickets is so large is that for many mega
sporting events, the two teams that will play in the final game (or four teams in a
final-four) are not known until a short period before the game. The NBA Finals,
NHL Stanley Cup, and MLB World Series consists of best-of- series (i.e., a head-to-
head competition where the two competitors compete to first win the majority of the
games), where the competing teams host the games in a pre-set order. However, the
NFL Super Bowl, NCAA Men’s Basketball Final-Four, and College Football Playoff
National Championship are played in a single-game format at a neutral site. The tick-
eting market for these events starts months (or even years) in advance, which makes
matching demand with supply and dealing with the resale market a real challenge for
the event organizers.
1Around 50% of all major pro league clubs used variable or dynamic pricing techniques in 2016.
2The figures are from PricewaterhouseCoopers Sports Outlook issued in October 2015 (pwc.com/
us/en/industry/entertainment-media/publications/sports-outlook-north-america.html)
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Table 4.1 Ticket Information for Major Tournaments
Name Ticket Allocation and Resale Options
Super Bowl 35% to teams playing, 6.5% to host team, 33.6% to
(2018) remaining teams, and 25% to NFL
Lottery (1000), On Location Experiences packages (9000)
Resale market exists (not for public lottery tickets)
NCAA Men’s 26% to four teams playing, 4% to host venue, 30% to lottery,
Basketball 40% to NCAA, sponsors, media & organizing committee
Final-Four Significant number to PrimeSport packages
(2016) Resale via NCAA Ticket Exchange or other
College Football 50% to teams playing, 15% to host team, 10% TeamTix
Playoff National team reservations, 25% to College Football Playoff
Championship Lottery, significant number to Playoff Premium packages
(2016) Resale via Fan-to-Fan Ticket Marketplace or other
In these events, a significant portion of the tickets are allocated to teams playing
the games while another significant portion is frequently allocated to the fans of
hosting team (or city). These allocations are usually made through lotteries where
the priority is given to season ticket holders. The organizer then keeps some of
the tickets for the organization, players, coaches etc., and allocates the remainder to
sponsors, media, hospitality rights holder, and other fans. For details of the allocation
of tickets for a sample of major sporting events, see Table 4.1.
The customer base for these mega sporting events is typically more heterogeneous
than for a regular season game. There are fans who want to watch the game regardless
of the teams playing, just for the experience. On the other hand, there are fans who
only want to see the team that they support and therefore face a dilemma: They
may buy tickets before the teams are known and risk watching other teams, or they
may choose to wait until the teams are known and pay potentially higher prices in
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the secondary market (or possibly not even find tickets for the event at any price).
In this paper, we focus on the tickets for the College Football Playoff National
Championship game. College Football has a regular season (13 weeks, usually from
the first week of September to the last week of November) where teams play a regular
season, and Top-4 ranked teams make it to the semi-finals for the national title
game. The selection of these four teams is made by a committee (i.e., the Selection
Committee) which announces rankings weekly, starting five weeks before the official
decision.3 Fans can use various polls (the AP Poll, Coaches’ Poll etc.) during the
season, in addition to the Selection Committee’s weekly rankings to help predict a
given team’s probability of being selected. However, over the last 10 years only six (13)
of the pre-season Top-2 (Top-5) ranked teams and only eight (16) of the November
Top-2 (Top-5) ranked teams made it to the championship game.4 Although rankings,
standings, and the odds provided by the betting market can be used as a proxy,
these numbers show that there is a high level of uncertainty about which teams will
play in the championship game. In this setting, satisfying the team-fan demand and
maximizing ticket revenues is difficult for the organizer, because the finalist teams
are known only 9 to 11 days before the final, and the resale market is significant.
Event organizers in similar settings have been working on several solutions in
order to solve this demand-supply matching problem, including using conditional
tickets/packages and ticket options.5 Over the last two seasons, a significant por-
tion of College Football Playoff National Championship tickets (around 10%) were
allocated to Forward Market Media (FMM), which sold them using TeamTix, i.e.,
team-specific ticket options for the National Championship game. Here is how these
options work: A fan (she) can purchase a ticket option for her favorite team. If the
3This has been the format since the 2014 season.
4The AP Poll rankings is used when the Selection Committee rankings are not available.
5We provide information in Appendix C about other sports leagues that follow a similar format.
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team qualifies to play in the National Championship game, she is obliged to purchase
a ticket at face-value to the game. Thus, the total amount she pays is equal to the
sum of the option price and the face-value amount. If the team does not qualify, she
only pays the option price.
FMM uses a sophisticated approach for the price/capacity decisions for TeamTix,
which works similar to a simple revenue management tool with capacity-controls,
i.e., price levels rise and fall based on the demand, and ignores how fans react to
their teams’ performance. Such an algorithm can only passively respond to demand
changes, however a successful algorithm should be optimizing prices by updating its
demand expectation based on important events such as the game results, ranking
changes, etc. We also observe that the algorithm does not respond to the trades in
the marketplace, another interesting feature of the TeamTix market.
In this paper, we seek to better understand how customers make their purchasing
and reselling decisions in this market. Using a unique data set, we investigate the
main drivers of volume changes for market transactions and trade offers. We first
show how game results (e.g., win against a top opponent, loss etc.) and rankings can
change the market dynamics. In addition, we share our observations for the team
market size heterogeneity and fans’ game day reaction. Finally, we present evidence
of speculative behavior in the market. Thus, our results provide guidance for an
event organizer on how to price team-specific ticket options and how to deal with the
marketplace.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section reviews the
literature on the ticket options. §4.3 provides details on TeamTix and its market-
place. §4.4 discusses the customer decision-making process and describes the market
dynamics. §4.5 presents our data and empirical approach. §4.6 and §4.7 demonstrate
our empirical results on the market transactions and trade offers, respectively. §4.8
concludes with some important managerial insights.
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4.2 Literature Review
In this paper, we address a new revenue management practice named “team-specific
ticket options”. Happel and Jennings (2001) suggest that a potential futures market
for major event tickets may be beneficial. Sainam et al. (2010) study the ticket
options that can be used in the sports industry. Using a stylized two-fan model (one
team-based fan who is interested in watching her team only and one game-based
fan who is interested in the game regardless of the teams playing) with a known
probability for the occurence of preferred game, they show that consumer options
may result in revenues at least as high as those from advance selling (before finalists
are known) and full information pricing (after finalists are known). Additionally,
they conduct an empirical study with 155 undergraduate students and show that
team-based fans are willing to pay more for the consumer options compared to the
tickets. Cui et al. (2014) discuss the pricing strategies for a single game with known
teams (or a concert), and show when resale may be beneficial for event organizers
who face die-hard fans that arrive early and busy professionals that decide later. The
authors show through a stylized two-period model that resale is always beneficial
for an organizer using fixed pricing and may also be good for an event organizer
using multi-period pricing when the capacity is small. Finally, they offer a revenue
improving solution where consumers initially buy an option, which they can exercise
at a later date if still interested in the game. Note that in their setting, there is no
uncertainty involved about the game to be played, since the teams are known and
the main source of uncertainty is the consumer’s valuation for the game.
The team-specific ticket options concept is also discussed in several papers. Bal-
seiro et al. (2011) consider a setup with a knockout tournament where the event
organizer sells advance tickets and “tournament options” for each team. The authors
focus on the joint problem of pricing and capacity allocation, and using a determin-
istic approximation they show that options are beneficial only if the demand is high
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and fans strictly prefer their own team. Their analysis, however, is limited to the
symmetric case (i.e., all teams have equal chances of making it to the final game, equal
arrival rates for arrival of fans of different teams, and identical fan valuations). While
the previously described work offers some analytical insights, it is important to em-
pirically measure the market response to team performance and rankings/standings,
as well as the team-level heterogeneities to correctly price the team-specific ticket
options. In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis for market dynamics (with fan
and team-level heterogeneities) using a unique data set, which will be described in
the next section.
Sainam et al. (2015) take a first cut at understanding fans’ decision-making in the
“consumer forwards” market. Using a data set for the 2006 NCAA Men’s Basketball
Final-Four forwards, they analyze the purchase and resale transactions in a team-
forward market to understand the drivers of a “good purchase”, i.e., if the consumer
buys the forward and the team makes it to the Final-Four, and a “good resale”, i.e.,
if the consumer sells the forward and her team does not make it to the Final-Four.
After identifying team-based fans, game-based fans, and speculators, they show the
factors influencing the likelihood of ending up with a forward on a team that makes
it to the Final-Four, and of reselling a forward on a team that does not make it to
the Final-Four. Although this paper is an important step to understand the fans’
decision-making process, it focuses on the individuals, not the organization in charge
of selling the team-specific options. Taking an operations perspective, we focus on the
drivers of transaction and offer volumes in the team-specific options market. Through
our empirical results, we provide key insights on pricing for an organizer that uses
team-specific ticket options.
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4.3 TeamTix
FMM, the provider of TeamTix team-specific ticket options, was the official partner
of College Football Playoff during 2015 and 2016 seasons.6 Other than selling team-
specific ticket options for the National Championship game, the company also offered
a marketplace through their website for fans to trade these options. The initial option
prices were set by the College Football Playoff at the beginning of the season, but
prices were then dictated by the demand changes in the market, described as follows.
Fans can buy options directly from the main channel at the market price. Fans who
own options can place them for sale (called an offer) at any price in the marketplace.
These options can be purchased by other fans until the market is closed. In addition,
fans who are not willing to pay the current market price or the lowest offer price
can also bid in the marketplace. In order for a bid to become an actual option, it
should be matched to the market price or the lowest offer price in the future. In the
marketplace, fans can modify or withdraw their offers and bids at any time (unless a
transaction occurs). Note that FMM gets a transaction fee of 10% from buyers and
15% from sellers with $5 being the minimum.
For marketing purposes, the company tweets transactions as well as announce-
ments for offers and bids for marketing purposes (Figure 4.1). There are three types
of tweets: (i) “Market Update”, announcement for an actual transaction, (ii) “Lowest
Offer”, announcement of an offer which is higher than the current market price, but
lower than all other offer prices, and (iii) “Highest Bid”, announcement of a bid (for
the market) which is lower than the current market price, but higher than all other
bid prices.7
6FMM encountered some legal issues which were not related to TeamTix, and is no longer able
to sell TeamTix. A new company, ShooWin, signed a licensing deal and will use FMM’s technology
starting with the 2017 season.
7The number of options involved (1 to 6 seats), team name, stadium seating level (Zone 400 vs.
Zone 100, standard and end zone respectively), and price information are also posted.
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Figure 4.1 TeamTix Tweet for a Market Update
4.4 Fans’ Decision-Making Process
Before going into empirical analysis, we create a stylized model to understand the
decision-making of a fan and dynamics of TeamTix market.
4.4.1 Model Setup
We define a stylized model using the following setup:
Timeline: The season consists of two parts before the final game: Early season
(T = 1 to T = 2) and late season (T = 2 to T = 3).8 All fans are present in the
system at T = 1.
Pricing: (i) A team-specific ticket option for team i is priced at pi1 at T = 1 and pi2
at T = 2. pi2’s are announced at T = 2.
(ii) A fan with an option for team i can sell her option from pi2 at T = 2, but has to
pay a transaction fee of θ (a percentage based on the option price).
(iii) If team i makes it to the final game, a fan with an option has to exercise the
option at T = 3 and pay an additional pf , the face value of the ticket.
Fans’ Belief : (i) At T = 1, each fan j of team i has a belief on the probability that
team i makes it safely to the late season9, qi1j. (ii) At T = 1, fan j of team i has a
8One can think of early season as a certain part of the regular season, and late season as the
rest of the regular season and the semi-final game for College Football.
9Most College Football teams play 12 games in the regular season, while the teams considered
for the semi finals have at most one loss. Therefore, a loss or two in the early season make it almost
impossible for the team to make it to the final game.
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belief on the probability that team i makes it to the final game (conditional on the
team successfully making it to the late season), qi2j, which can be updated at T = 2.
Fan Valuations: (i) Fan j of team i has a valuation Vij for the final game, if team
i plays in the final. If the team does not make it to the final, the fan has a zero
valuation.
(ii) Fan j of team i has an expectation for pi2j at T = 1, denoted by pˆi2j.
4.4.2 Optimal Decision-Making Path
As shown in Figure 4.2, a fan j of team i chooses one of four decision paths to follow:10
1. Buy an option at T = 1 and keep it.
2. Buy an option at T = 1 and try to sell it at T = 2.
3. Do not buy the option in period 1, but buy it in period 2.
4. Do not buy the option.
In order to find the optimal decision path for each fan, we use backward induction
starting with T = 2. If the fan has the option at T = 2, then she can (i) keep the
option with an expected utility of q2(V − pf ), or (ii) sell the option with a utility of
p2(1− θ). Therefore, a fan would keep the option only if:
q2 ≥ K1 = p2(1− θ)(V − pf ) (4.1)
and try to sell it otherwise. On the other hand, if the fan does not have the option at
T = 2, then she can (i) buy an option with an expected utility of −p2 + q2(V − pf ),
or (ii) do not buy the option with a utility of 0. In this scenario, a fan would buy an
option only if:
q2 ≥ K2 = p2
V − pf (4.2)
10For simplicity, we omit the i and j’s in the following notation.
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Figure 4.2 Fans’ Decision-making Process
The values on each arrow represent the net utility of the actions taken. “+” repre-
sents that the team is still “alive” in the competition, “-” represents that team will
not make it to the final game.
and would not buy otherwise. We show that a fan’s belief on the probability that
team i makes it to the final game (conditional on the team successfully making it to
the late season), q2, falls into one of three regions:
• q2 ≤ K1: The fan should try to sell (if bought at T = 1) or should not buy (if
not bought at T = 1).
• K1 ≤ q2 ≤ K2: The fan should keep (if bought at T = 1) or should not buy (if
not bought at T = 1).
• q2 ≥ K2: The fan should keep (if bought at T = 1) or buy (if not bought at
T = 1).
Figure 4.3 represents the decision thresholds for a fan at T = 2, depending on her
q2. Note that we have used the wording “try to sell” so far, because a fan may not be
able to sell her option at T = 2 if the market demand is less than the total supply.
Denote sˆ as a fan’s belief for the chance of selling the option at T = 2. Note that a fan
does not know the true p2 at T = 1 (but has an expected value pˆ2) and may update
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Figure 4.3 Fans’ Optimal Decisions at T = 2
q2 at T = 2. Working backwards, we now present the analysis of decision-making at
T = 1:
• q2 ≤ K1: If the fan buys an option and then tries to sell, then her expected
utility is Ubs = −p1 + q1sˆpˆ2(1− θ) + q1(1− sˆ)q2(V − pf ). If she does not buy at
all, then the utility is Unn = 0. Therefore, a fan should buy an option at T = 1
to sell at T = 2 only if:
q1 ≥ p1
sˆpˆ2(1− θ) + q2(1− sˆ)(V − pf ) (4.3)
and should not buy (at any point) otherwise.
• K1 ≤ q2 ≤ K2: If the fan buys an option and then keeps it, then her expected
utility is Ubk = −p1 + q1q2(V − pf ). If she does not buy at all, then Unn = 0.
Therefore, a fan should buy an option to keep at T = 1 only if:
q1 ≥ p1
q2(V − pf ) (4.4)
and should not buy (at any point) otherwise.
• q2 ≥ K2: If the fan buys an option to keep, then Ubk = −p1 + q1q2(V − pf ).
If she does not buy at T = 1, but buys at T = 2, then her expected utility is
Unb = q1[−pˆ2 + q2(V −pf )]. Therefore, a fan should buy an option to keep later
only if:
q1 ≥ p1
pˆ2
(4.5)
and should wait to buy at T = 2 otherwise.
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Figure 4.4 Market Segmentation based on q1 and q2 for the Numerical Example
4.4.3 Expected Fan Behavior and Market Dynamics
Consider the following example (team i) for a given set of market parameters, p1 =
100, pf = 700, θ = 0.25, common fan valuation V = 1000, common belief on the
chance of being able to sell sˆ = 0.5, and expectation for the price at T = 2, pˆ2 = 200.
We show the market segmentation for team i based on the optimal actions for q1, q2 ∈
(0, 1) in Figure 4.4. We see four segments mentioned earlier: (i) Buy-to-keepers with
high q1 and q2, (ii) Buy-to-sellers with high q1 and low q2, (iii) wait-to-buyers with
low q1 and high q2, and (iv) no buyers. We discuss two potential deviations that may
be observed in the market:
Deviation of p2: We noted earlier that fans have only an expectation on p2 at T = 1.
However, they may alter their original action if they observe a different p2 than what
they expect. For a fan base who under- or over-estimates p2, we provide the changes in
the size of the market segments in Table 4.2. Remember that we observe that FMM’s
algorithm does not change the prices based on the game results or team rankings, but
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changes them based on the demand. In this setting, the prices may be cheaper than
fan’s expectations immediately after an important win, i.e., fans have overestimated
p2. When this happens, some fans who originally did not plan to buy the option
at T = 2 may actually buy. In addition, fans who bought the option at T = 1 to
sell may find selling unprofitable and decide to keep. Note that this decrease in the
“buy-to-sellers” will be equal to the increase in the “buy-to-keepers”. Therefore, we
expect an important win to give a positive demand shock to the market. However,
this demand shock may increase the prices into a high level, which may lead some
“buy-to-keepers” to turn to “buy-to-sellers”.
Table 4.2 Potential Changes in the Market Segments after p2 is Observed
Case Wait-to-buy Buy-to-keep Buy-to-sell
p2 > pˆ2 ↓ ↓ ↑
p2 < pˆ2 ↑ ↑ ↓
Deviation of q2: If the fan base increases their q2 for a team after watching the early
season (T = 1 to T = 2), we would observe more “buy-to-keepers” (i.e., some “buy-
to-sellers” become interested in keeping their options) and buyers than expected at
T = 2. Therefore, we expect to see a positive demand shock if the a team does much
better than expected. On the other hand, if the team does worse than expectations,
e.g., has an unexpected loss, fans may lower their q2, which leads to more “buy-to-
sellers”. In this scenario, we expect to see more offers in the marketplace. Note that
a change in q2 does not change the boundaries of the regions, but the densities for
(q1, q2) beliefs.
4.4.4 Speculators
In this subsection, we discuss the case of speculators whose goal is to make profit
through buying an option at T = 1 and selling at T = 2. These speculators have a
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zero valuation for the game, regardless of the teams. A speculator basically compares
her utility between not buying (with Unn = 0) and buying to sell (with Ubs = −p1 +
q1sˆpˆ2(1− θ)). Therefore, a speculator should buy an option to sell at T = 1 only if:
q1 ≥ p1
sˆpˆ2(1− θ) (4.6)
and should not get into the market otherwise.
For rational speculators to enter the market, their pˆ2 and sˆ should be high enough.
Note that sˆ can be high enough only if there is an expectation for a significant wait-
to-buy segment, i.e., fans who have a low q1 and high q2. Given (4.6), we see that
an equilibrium with rational speculators can exist only if the fans under-estimate or
speculators over-estimate the true q1. Note that if some of the fans are not present in
the market at T = 1, speculators will have a higher chance to sell to these late-comers,
therefore we expect to see more speculators.
4.5 Data and Empirical Methodology
4.5.1 Data Preparation and Variables
We have collected the following data for the 2015 season of College Football (Septem-
ber 1st to December 31st): Tweets from @cfpteamtix,11 detailed game information
(i.e., day/time, location, rivalry, conference game, final score, betting market odds),
and rankings (i.e., AP Poll and Selection Committee rankings).12
The regular season was 13 week-long (from September 3rd to November 29th).
After it ended, the conference championship games were played within the next week.
On December 6th, the Selection Committee announced the semi-finals (i.e., Clem-
son vs. Oklahoma and Alabama vs. Michigan State), which were to be played on
11Twitter’s Advanced Search feature does not allow us to reach all tweets of an account although
it goes until the date of account opening. Therefore, we use twimemachine.com, which displays all
tweets up to a certain point in the past, to periodically scrape the @cfpteamtix feed.
12As mentioned earlier, Selection Committee announces rankings starting on November 3rd. We
use Selection Committee rankings when available, but use AP Poll rankings for the earlier period.
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Table 4.3 Number of Tweets and Related Seat Capacity by Team, Zone, and
Tweet Type
Transactions Offers
Zone100 Zone400 Zone100 Zone400
Team Tweets Seats Tweets Seats Tweets Seats Tweets Seats
Alabama 78 193 70 166 53 188 37 123
Baylor 37 86 40 117 21 51 19 60
Clemson 94 249 93 252 55 164 38 87
Iowa 30 90 38 104 5 17 19 52
Louisiana St 82 233 76 247 23 58 24 89
Michigan St 4 4 69 214 15 48 23 77
Mississippi 18 67 29 99 16 43 18 75
Notre Dame 76 208 88 235 49 154 59 188
Ohio State 57 150 66 184 53 174 47 135
Oklahoma 45 132 39 124 3 7 16 59
TOTAL 521 1412 608 1742 293 904 300 945
December 31st.13 Our data spans the period from September 1st to December 31st;
however, we note that TeamTix were not sold during the conference championship
week (from November 30th to December 5th) based on College Football Playoff’s
decision.
After combining these different data sources, we choose 10 teams with high tweet
volumes: Alabama, Baylor, Clemson, Iowa, Louisiana State, Michigan State, Missis-
sippi, Notre Dame, Ohio State, and Oklahoma. Table 4.3 presents the number of
tweets and related seat capacities (we call this volume) for each team, seating zone
and tweet type (transactions vs. offers). For market transactions, we have a total
of 1129 tweets for a seat volume of 3154 (Clemson leads with 501 seats). For trade
offers, we have a total of 593 tweets for a seat volume of 1849 (Notre Dame leads with
342 seats). We share a weekly snapshot for Alabama’s regular season in Appendix C.
We use daily volume (i.e., actual capacity, not the number of tweets) for market
13Winners of the semi-final match-ups, Clemson and Alabama, faced each other in the National
Championship game on January 11th (2016), and Alabama won the title.
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Table 4.4 Variable Descriptions
Name Detail
TopWinit 1 if team i won against a top-10 opponent in the last match, 0 o.w.
QualWinit 1 if team i won against an opponent ranked 11-25 in the last match, 0 o.w.
Lossit 1 if team i lost the last match, 0 o.w.
RivalWinit 1 if team i won against a rival in the last match, 0 o.w.
WinAOit 1 if team i won against the odds in the last match, 0 o.w.
Byeit 1 if team i had a bye (i.e., did not play a game) in the last week
Rankit Team i’s CFP ranking for a given day (AP Poll ranking when not available)
RankMomit Last change in the ranking of team i
EnterTop4it 1 if team i entered Top 4 in the last ranking announcement, 0 o.w.
LeaveTop4it 1 if the team i left Top 4 in the last ranking announcement, 0 o.w.
SALESikt The number of seats involved in transactions for team i in zone k on day t
OFFERSikt The number of seats involved in offers for team i in zone k on day t
transactions and trade offers (for each team and zone) as our dependent variables. All
variables are defined in Table 4.4. Although our variables are at the daily level, the
value of our independent variables change only after games or ranking announcements.
4.5.2 Count-data models: Poisson and Negative Binomial
In this section, we explain two count-data models used in our analysis. Our natural
starting point is the Poisson model. The Poisson model has a probability mass
function (where µ is the rate parameter):
Pr(Y = y) = e
−µµy
y! , y = 0, 1, 2, ... (4.7)
with E(Y ) = V ar(Y ) = µ (equidispersion property, i.e., mean-variance equality).
We use the following mean parametrization:
µ = ex′β (4.8)
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When the equidispersion property is violated, we use the Negative Binomial dis-
tribution whose probability mass function is (where Γ(.) denotes the gamma integral
and α denotes its variance parameter):
Pr(Y = y|µ, α) = Γ(α
−1 + y)
Γ(α−1Γ(y + 1)
(
α−1
α−1 + µ
)α−1(
µ
α−1 + µ
)y
, y = 0, 1, 2, ... (4.9)
with E(Y |µ, α) = µ and V ar(Y |µ, α) = µ(1 + αµ). The Negative Binomial model
allows the use of the same mean parametrization, µ = ex′β, and leaves α as a constant.
4.5.3 Empirical Metholodogy
As for our empirical approach, we start with the simple Poisson model. We next use
the Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimator to relax the equidispersion assumption to
obtain a robust estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimator. Then, we
test for equidispersion V ar(y|x) = E(y|x). To do this, we follow Cameron and Trivedi
(2009) and implement an auxiliary regression of the generated dependent variable,
{(y − µˆ) − y}/µˆ on µˆ, without an intercept term and perform a t test of whether
the coefficient of µˆ is zero. If the coefficient of µˆ is significantly different than zero,
the test suggests the presence of overdispersion. Then, we use the Negative Binomial
model, which explicitly models the overdispersion. Finally, we use a Likelihood Ratio
test for the hypothesis H0 : α = 0.
While using these models in STATA 14, we try models with different sets of
independent variables in our analyses, from a model with only control variables to a
full model:
• Model 1 (base model) includes team and week fixed effects, and the number
days of since the last match (or the bye-day of team i): Teami, Weekt, Lagit
• Model 2: Model 1 and game result variables (TopWinit, QualWinit, Lossit,
RivalWinit, WinAOit, Byeit)
• Model 3: Model 1 and ranking variables (Rankit, RankMomit)
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• Model 4: Model 1 and Top 4 related variables (EnterTop4it, LeaveTop4it)
• Model 5: Model 1, game result and ranking variables
• Model 6: Model 1, game result, ranking and Top 4 related variables
4.6 Sales in the Market
In this section, we first present the results of our empirical estimation and discuss
the main drivers of the TeamTix sales volume. Then, we discuss the team-level
heterogeneity and game day effect on the sales.
4.6.1 Empirical Results
Since all the Poisson models fail the equidispersion test (p < 0.001), we use the
Negative Binomial model. A Likelihood Ratio test shows that α is significantly
different than 0.
We report the Negative Binomial results for total volume, volume for Zone 400
(standard seats) and Zone 100 (end zone seats) using Model 5 (controls, game result
variables and ranking variables) in Table 4.5, because the Top 4 related variables
(EnterTop4it, LeaveTop4it) do not make any improvement in the model fit. Although
we share the actual coefficients of the models in Table 4.5, we use incident rate
ratios for the discussion.14 Based on our final models, a win against a top-10 ranked
opponent is expected to increase the sales by 167% for Zone 400 (191% for Zone 100)
for the following week. On the other hand, a team ranked n + 1 receives 14% less
Zone 400 (and 15% less Zone 100) sales compared to a team ranked n for a given
week. These results are consistent with our expectations from our stylized model. In
addition to these two consistently significant independent variables, our results show
14This is the estimated rate ratio for a unit change in an independent variable, given that the
other variables are held constant in the model. For example, an incident rate ratio of 1.5 can be
translated to having a rate 1.5 times greater for the dependent variable for a unit change in the
independent variable.
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Table 4.5 Models on Sale Volume
Total Zone 400 Zone 100
TopWin 0.992*** 0.982*** 1.069***
QualWin 0.145 -0.228 0.555**
Loss -0.045 -0.448* 0.298
RivalWin 0.238 0.294* 0.374*
WinAO 0.247 0.313 0.448
Bye -0.416* -0.464* -0.265
Rank -0.153*** -0.157*** -0.150***
RankMom -0.005 0.024 -0.030
Team Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Lag Yes Yes Yes
N 860 860 860
R2 0.0952 0.111 0.1045
*: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01
that a win against a team ranked 11-25 has a smaller positive effect on Zone 100 sales
(by 74%).
Figure 4.5 shows two examples of the predicted outcomes and actual outcomes
for Alabama (Zone 400) and Iowa (Zone 400).15
4.6.2 Team-level heterogeneity
Including team fixed effects in our model allows us to compare market sizes of teams
for a hypothetical scenario with teams having identical performance throughout the
season. Using incident rate ratios, we provide the expected percentage of sales for
each team compared to the reference team, Alabama (100%), in Figure 4.6. “Big
football” schools, Louisiana State and Notre Dame have much larger markets for
TeamTix. Interestingly, Clemson’s market size was also significantly larger than
Alabama’s. This may be due to the fact that before the 2015 season Clemson had
not won a national title or played a title game since 1981. Note that for all these
15Because the zero values issue, we cannot provide meaningful prediction fit statistics here.
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Figure 4.5 Examples of Predicted and Actual Outcomes
teams, the difference for Zone 400 options is larger than that for Zone 100 options.
On the other hand, Michigan State and Ohio State market sizes are significantly
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Figure 4.6 Expected Percentage of Sales for an Example Set of Teams
smaller than Alabama.16 Our results do not show any significant differences between
Alabama and the rest of the teams, Iowa, Mississippi, and Oklahoma.
4.6.3 Daily differences in the sales: Immediate reaction to game
Our controls also include week fixed effects and the number of days after the last
match (or the “bye day”). Using incident rate ratios, we provide the expected per-
centage of sales for each day following the game day, compared to the reference day,
i.e., game day, in Table 4.6. Our results show that the TeamTix market has signifi-
cantly more visitors on the game day compared to other days. Note that the other
days do not follow a specific pattern (i.e., increase, decrease, U-shape etc.). There are
two possible explanations for this. First, fans may only care about the college football
(and National Championship Game) while their team is playing a game. Second, fans
usually do not get any information (except player injuries etc.) throughout the week,
thus there is little benefit on purchasing options until the game day. We discuss the
pricing implications of this phenomena in §4.8.
16The interestingly low 1% for Michigan’s Zone 100 sales is somewhat expected, because only 4
Zone 100 seats were sold throughout the regular season.
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Table 4.6 Expected Percentage of Sales for Each Day Following the Game Day
Day Zone 100 Zone 400
1 32% 39%
2 32% 38%
3 43% 34%
4 31% 30%
5 28% 27%
6 52% 32%
4.7 Drivers of the Offer Volume
In this section, we first present the results of our empirical models and discuss the
main drivers leading TeamTix owners to offer their options to the market. Then, we
share an interesting finding about potential speculators in the market.
4.7.1 Empirical Results
Similar to the models in the previous section, all Poisson models fail the equidispersion
test (p < 0.001). Therefore, we additionally use the Negative Binomial model. The
Likelihood Ratio test shows that α is significantly different than 0.
4.7.2 Offer Volume
We report the Negative Binomial results for total volume, volume for Zone 400 and
Zone 100 using Model 6 (controls, game result variables, ranking variables, and Top 4
related variables) in Table 4.7, since it provides the best fit. Based on our final models,
a game loss is expected to increase the number of selling offers in the market by 220%
for Zone 400 (158% for Zone 100). This is parallel to the analytical explanation based
on our stylized model. Interestingly, we find that the number of selling offers for a
team ranked n+ 1 is 12% less for Zone 400 (and 6% less for Zone 100) compared to
a team ranked n for a given week. This is counter-intuitive, because one may expect
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Table 4.7 Models On Offer Volume
Total Zone 400 Zone 100
TopWin -0.024 0.947* -1.332**
QualWin 0.249 0.665 -0.547
Loss 1.012*** 1.164*** 0.948*
RivalWin -0.253 -0.493 0.034
WinAO -0.174 -1.241 1.166
Bye -0.741* -1.247** -0.510
Rank -0.109*** -0.127*** -0.063*
RankMom -0.054 0.003 -0.094*
EnterTop4 0.204 0.387 -0.164
LeaveTop4 0.667* 0.631 0.829*
Team Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Lag Yes Yes Yes
N 860 860 860
R2 0.131 0.134 0.1408
that a team’s fans try to sell their TeamTix if they lose their hope for their team
making it to the National Championship Game.
4.7.3 Speculators in the Market
Although a team-fan is likely to buy TeamTix for only one team, the current system
allows customers to buy TeamTix for multiple teams. We do not have any personal
identifiers in our data set, however we suspect that our unexpected finding on the
effect of rankings may be due to customers who purchase ticket options to sell if the
team performs well, i.e., speculators. Sainam et al. (2015) shows that a significant
portion of customers bought options for two to five teams and a small portion bought
options for six or more teams in the 2006 College Basketball season, which supports
our suspicion.
In order to formally investigate the existence of speculators, we introduce two new
variables: FinalEnterTop4it and FinalLeaveTop4it, which is equal to 1 if team i en-
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Table 4.8 Models on Offer Volume Considering Speculators
Total Zone 400 Zone 100
TopWin 0.067 0.889 -1.137*
QualWin 0.018 0.434 -0.716
Loss 1.044*** 1.101*** 1.057**
RivalWin -0.222 -0.471 0.090
WinAO 0.175 -0.842 1.342
Bye -0.707* -1.244* -0.453
Rank -0.085*** -0.094*** -0.051
RankMom -0.027 0.037 -0.075
EnterTop4 -1.104** -0.673 -1.228*
LeaveTop4 1.315*** 1.459** 1.462**
FinalEnterTop4 3.918*** 3.500*** 3.155**
FinalLeaveTop4 -1.102* -1.135 -1.062
Team Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Lag Yes Yes Yes
N 860 860 860
R2 0.1412 0.1419 0.1463
tered and left respectively, the Top 4 after a Selection Committee ranking announce-
ment during last 25 days of the regular season. We run a similar set of Negative
Binomial models and present our results in Table 4.8. We observe an interesting case
here: Although entering the Top 4 has a negative effect on the number of seats offered
in the market before November, entering the Top 4 in November actually increases
the number of seats offered.17 This is parallel to our analytical explanation for the
speculators and suggests that there are speculators in the market who buy options
early in the season and sell later when the team climbs in the rankings.
17In order to show this, we test if the sum of the coefficients for EnterTop4 and FinalEnterTop4
is different than zero. Our tests show the sum is significantly higher than zero (p<0.001 for Zone
400, p<0.05 for Zone 100).
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4.8 Conclusions and Managerial Insights
In this paper, we focus on an innovative revenue management practice for the sports
industry, named team-specific ticket options. This product gives a fan the chance to
buy an option for sporting events where the two teams that will play are not known
in advance and the fan only pays the ticket face value if his/her team makes it to
the final. It reduces the risk for fans (i.e., ending up with a ticket in hand to watch
other teams or trying to find a ticket through highly overpriced resale market), and
also helps the organizer to match demand and supply during the short time between
the announcement of the finalists and the game day.
College Football Playoff, the organizer of the College Football National Champi-
onship game, partnered with Forward Market Media (FMM), who offers team-specific
options called TeamTix, in the last two years and allocated a significant portion of
the stadium capacity to TeamTix. On the other hand, the implementation was not
a success because of several reasons. In this paper, we take a look at the TeamTix
market combining behavioral dynamics and a unique data set we created for 2015
season.
We provide the following insights for event organizers and team-specific ticket
option platforms:
Pricing of team-specific ticket options: As mentioned earlier, the price of TeamTix
is dictated by the market demand. In addition to the significant team, rank and week
effects, we show that a win against a Top 10 ranked opponent increases the sale volume
during the week. We also observe significantly more sales on the day the team plays
a game.
The traditional revenue management approach used by FMM’s algorithm natu-
rally increases the price when the demand rate gets higher than expected, by closing
cheap fare classes. Therefore, when the team wins against a Top 10 ranked oppo-
nent, a sudden increase in the demand rate is observed as suggested by our model in
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Figure 4.7 Price for Alabama TeamTix (Regular Season)
§4.6 and the prices increase. See the price changes for Alabama Zone 100 and Zone
400 options in Figure 4.7 for the 5th, 7th and 9th games18 where Alabama had wins
against the top 10 opponents.
On the other hand, we observe that the algorithm spends a significant amount
of time to detect the demand increase. However, a better Revenue Management
system should effectively respond to a top win by updating the demand expectation
(as predicted by our model) and increase the price into a higher level immediately.
Since the price optimization is beyond the scope of our paper, we only provide some
general guidelines for the organizers:
• While setting base prices at the beginning of the season, the platform should
consider not only the team’s chance of making it to the final game, but also the
market size.
18Note that game times are marked by vertical lines.
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• Since fans can only update the probabilities of their team making it to the final
after observing the result of the last match and team performance (and the
corresponding rank change), prices should be updated immediately after each
match is over, and adjusted only if demand deviates from the predicted.
• Given we observe more market movements on the game days, the platform
should monitor the changes very closely.
Marketplace and Speculators: Although team-specific options is a way to deal with
issues related to the resale market, the existence of a marketplace for TeamTix creates
its own problems.19 Our analysis shows that there are speculators in the market who
buy the options from a cheaper price and sell at the end of the season if the team does
well. This may be happening because of the following reasons: (i) Most fans do not
form strong expectations for their team at the beginning of the season, but then may
highly inflate their expectations after seeing their team performing. (ii) Speculators
are aware of the TeamTix market and buy TeamTix earlier than most of the fans.
The current marketplace allows people to offer for trade from the price of their
choice. Therefore, we observe many occurrences where a fan (or a speculator) sells its
TeamTix a little bit cheaper than the main channel. The pricing algorithm should be
able to respond this by using some type of matching strategy, especially for the teams
with low market sizes because the chance of selling team-specific ticket options equal
to the allocated capacity is really low and each trade directly decreases the platform
profits (i.e., platform can only get a transaction fee). We do not present an analysis
on this, however we believe that it is an interesting future research direction.
There are several limitations in our study. First, we specifically focus on the seat
capacities, and ignore the number of tweets which may be helpful in several cases.
For example, two people offering two seats each is identical to one person offering
19We have anecdotal evidence that marketplace has a positive effect on people who are indecisive
about buying TeamTix.
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four seats in our models. Combining tweet volume and seat capacity may be a good
step for extending our analysis. Second, we do not have personal identifiers in the
data, therefore we cannot really know if there are any fans who bought for multiple
teams, and offered their TeamTix to the market at different times. Finally, we do
not consider the final location in our study. We believe that the pricing system must
adjust the team market bases for the location of the final site. For example, the
2016 Championship game (of 2015 season) was played in Phoenix, AZ. The location
was quite far for all 10 teams of analysis and the resulting resale market prices were
cheaper than expected. On the other hand, the 2017 Championship game (of 2016
season) featured the same two teams, Alabama and Clemson, although the resale
market prices were much more expensive (around three to five times more) compared
to the previous season, because the game was in Tampa, FL. Given that the fans
have a side option to wait for the resale market, the pricing algorithm should make
the necessary adjustments for the teams which are close to the final game site.
We believe that team-specific tickets is a promising area of future research for the
Operations Management field, and may have potential areas of application outside of
the current domain. For example, hotels near the final game site can easily allocate
some rooms for team fans and sell team-specific options. This actually works better
than regular options where fans have the flexibility not to exercise the option (which
creates a high-level of uncertainty), because team-specific options are automatically
exercised when a team makes it to the final. Although the related airline problem
would be too complicated because the origin-team combinations can be too many,
we believe that team-specific options can be useful for the origin cities with a high
density fan base for a specific team.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Research
In this dissertation, we discuss two Revenue Management practices with probabilistic
elements (i.e., standby upgrades and team-specific ticket options). While using such
practices, hotels and event organizers are susceptible to strategic customer behav-
ior. We use both analytical and econometric approaches to investigate our research
questions.
Chapter 2 and 3 of this dissertation are on standby upgrades, which is a fairly
new innovative practice in the hotel industry, while Chapter 4 studies team-specific
ticket options, an innovative practice used in sporting events. In particular, Chapter
2 discusses how to optimally price standby upgrades (i.e., a practice where the guest
is only charged if the discounted upgrade is available at the time of arrival) and
evaluates their benefits through an analytical model. Chapter 3 uses a major hotel
chain’s booking and standby upgrades data to investigate the extent of strategic guest
behavior through empirical analysis. Chapter 4 studies fans’ decision-making process
for team-specific ticket options for the College Football Championship game using a
unique data set.
Chapter 2 has been already published in Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management. For Chapter 3, our next step would be to increase the number of the
hotel properties analyzed. In order to do this, we will work on the complex problem
of multiple standby upgrade offers. In addition, instead of searching for strategic
behavior, we may create several different strategic behavior models and estimate
the percentage of strategic customers based on these different models. Free upgrade
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eligibility is another interesting issue we can focus on.
For Chapter 4, our next step would be to prepare a similar 2016 College Football
season, which may help us generalize our results and offer new insights. We also expect
to see the importance of the location of the final match. Empirically, although our
current model provides a reasonable fit, we plan working on a hurdle-like model which
takes tweets and seats into account at two different steps and potentially provides a
much better fit. Finally, we may revisit our stylized model in order to focus on the
price optimization problem. Then, we can use our data sets to test how good our
suggestions work in real life scenarios.
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Appendix A
Supplement for Chapter 2
Analysis on Assumption 4:
An alternative approach for setting p and pS would be to use a set of two valua-
tions (vS, vP ) for the standard and premium rooms, respectively (priced at s and
s + p). When the standard room price (s) is fixed throughout the selling horizon,
this approach can provide closed-form solutions for the optimal prices, within cer-
tain distributional assumptions on the valuations of standard and premium rooms.
It is difficult to implement this approach in practice, however, for two main rea-
sons: First, hotels already use sophisticated techniques for setting the standard room
prices, which leads to dynamically changing prices over the selling horizon. Second,
hotels have historically pegged the price of their premium rooms to the price of their
standard room prices, providing little to no variability in the pricing differential be-
tween these two types of room. This makes the estimation of the joint distribution
of the customers’ valuations for the standard and premium rooms extremely difficult.
We avoid these problems by only focusing on the valuation for the premium room
differential, v = vP − vS. Note that this approach is identical to the two-valuation
approach for customers with vS ≥ s(t), where s(t) is the standard room price at time
t of the selling horizon. Since a guest searching for a hotel in an online travel agency
(e.g., Expedia) or the hotel brand website will first be exposed to the standard room
prices at different hotels1, it is reasonable to assume that guests of interest in our
1The common practice is to show the lowest rate of the hotel for online travel agencies and to
show the best available rate (BAR) of the different brand hotels in the area for the hotel chains.
Therefore, guests can see different room types only after choosing a specific hotel.
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analysis have vS ≥ s(t), i.e., a guest who finds the standard room price to be too high
at a specific property would not search for premium rooms in the same hotel.
Next, we show the equivalence of the two-valuation and differential-valuation ap-
proaches. A myopic guest first chooses the utility maximizing action among the
following options: No booking (utility of 0), booking a standard room (utility of
vS − s(t)) and booking a premium room (utility of vP − [s(t) + p]). She books the
standard room if vS ≥ s(t) and vS − s(t) ≥ vP − [s(t) + p]. Note that the second
condition is identical to v ≤ p. When she sees the standby upgrade offer, she then
chooses the utility maximizing action between rejecting the offer (utility of vS − s(t))
and accepting the offer (utility of vP−[s(t)+pS]). The second utility can be written as
(vS+v)−[s(t)+pS]. She accepts the offer if and only if vS−s(t) ≤ (vS+v)−[s(t)−pS],
which is identical to the condition v ≥ pS. Here is a numerical example: Consider our
partner’s property in New Orleans, LA with p = 45 and pS = 20. Assume that Guest
A has a valuation set (vS, vP ) = (220, 250) and visits the hotel website 20 days before
her day of stay and sees a standard room price of s(t1) = 189 (and a premium room
price of s(t1) + p = 234). In this scenario, she books the standard room because her
utility from the standard room is higher than her utility from booking the premium
room (220 − 189 = 31 > 250 − 234 = 16). After booking the standard room, she
receives and accepts the standby upgrade offer, because she has a chance to gain an
additional utility of [250− (189+20)]−31 = 10 if the premium room is awarded. Us-
ing our notation, since v = 250−220 = 30, the customer first books a standard room
(v < p) and then chooses the standby upgrade (v > pS). Now consider Customer B
with the same valuation set but who visits the hotel website only 3 days before the
day of stay and sees a standard room price of s(t2) = 279 (and a premium price of
s(t2)+p = 324). Since her utility is negative for the standard room and the premium
room (220− 279 = −59, 324− 250 = −74) at the time of booking, she does not book
a room.
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Figure A.1 WLS Estimation on Two Properties to Test for the Uniform
Pricing Assumption
p: Fixed differential, βprice: coefficient of price, Bubble size: weight of the data point in WLS
To help validate our linear price-demand model assumption, we utilize our part-
ner’s data on the booking and standby upgrade decisions. Note that the data does
not allow for a price sensitivity analysis of the differential since the hotels use fixed
price differentials. However, Nor1 changes the standby upgrade prices over time even
though they do not have access to a hotel’s remaining room capacity. This variability
in standby upgrade prices allows us to analyze the price sensitivity of guests to the
standby upgrade offers. To do so, we measure the association between the standby
upgrade price offered and the customers’ acceptance ratio by using a linear regression
approach. Since some prices are offered more than others, we use a weighted-least-
squares (WLS) estimation, where we use the square root of the number of guests
offered each price point as the weights. Our analysis of 8 different properties shows
that the coefficient for the standby upgrade price is negative and significant for all
the properties. Figure A.1 illustrates the results for two of these properties. In order
to test any nonlinear relationships between the standby upgrade price and the accep-
tance ratio, we also tried fitting the natural logarithm of price and the price-squared
as independent variables, but the linear relationship provided the best fit.
Analysis on Assumption 5:
In the dynamic pricing literature, there are two common approaches for modeling
the potential market size: Stochastic arrivals which can capture changing product
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Figure A.2 Standard vs. Premium Room Demand at a New Orleans Hotel
valuations and perceptions on the probability of a product being available over time
(Aviv and Pazgal, 2008; Elmaghraby et al., 2009; Yin et al., 2009; Osadchiy and
Vulcano, 2010), and simultaneous arrivals with a deterministic market size (Liu and
van Ryzin, 2008; Gallego et al., 2008). In the latter, the total number of customers is
assumed to be known by the seller, and when the customers arrive, they make their
decision based on the prices of the buy-now vs. wait options.
Our analysis of 16 months of hotel booking data shows that standard room demand
and premium demand are positively correlated, however the correlation is not as
strong as one may expect. There are many days where the standard room demand
is high while the premium room demand is relatively low (see Figure A.2a for an
example from a hotel property in New Orleans, LA where the correlation coefficient
between the standard room demand and premium room demand is only 0.55). We
think the reason as follows: For our guests, the ones who look for the cheapest deal
in the market have v = 0. These guests book standard rooms (or do not buy if
a competitor has a better deal), and are irrelevant for the premium room market.
On the other hand, other guests (with v > 0) make a decision between purchasing
a standard room with or without a standby upgrade and a premium room. The
partitioning of these two groups is based on market dynamics such as standard room
price paths, competitors’ price paths, existence of group reservations, etc. Therefore,
we choose the simultaneous arrivals approach since guest valuations for the premium
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room differential do not change over time, but assume a stochastic market size to
capture the uncertainty. For validation purposes, we simulate premium demand as
a function of standard room demand and find that the modeled outcomes are quite
close to the realized outcomes (see Figure A.2b).
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Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 1:
In this proof, we derive the optimal prices and expected revenues in the myopic case
for a given XU .
For each XU value, we have three candidate pricing strategies for the optimal price
set. These strategies have different expected revenue functions and constraints. We
first analyze Strategy 1 and Strategy 3 and show the optimal price sets under these,
and then use them to construct a solution for Strategy 2.
• For Strategy 1, the expected revenue function can be written as:
ΠMY 1 =
XU
2 [pSp− p
2
S + p− p2] where XU(1− pS) ≤ 1
We solve the unconstrained problem first. First order conditions (FOC) give us
(the constant is ignored):
∂ΠMY 1
∂p
= pS + 1− 2p = 0 ∂ΠMY 1
∂pS
= p− 2pS = 0
The optimal price set is (pS, p) = (13 ,
2
3) for the unconstrained problem (the
objective function is concave as its Hessian is negative definite). We have two
possibilities:
⇒ The constraint is satisfied when XU ≤ 32 ; therefore, the optimal price set for
the unconstrained problem is the optimal price set for the constrained problem
in this range.
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⇒ The constraint is violated when XU > 32 . Because of the concavity of the
expected revenue function, XU(1 − pS) = 1 must be binding at optimality.
Since the constraint is not a function of p, we can show (through the Lagrange
method) that pS + 1 − 2p = 0 must be satisfied. Therefore, pS = XU−1XU and
p = 2XU−12XU .
For Strategy 1, the optimal price set and resulting expected revenue for different
XU values are as follows:
(ps, p) =

(13 ,
2
3) if XU ≤ 32(
XU−1
XU
, 2XU−12XU
)
if XU ≥ 32
ΠMY 1 =

XU
6 if XU ≤ 32
4XU−3
8XU if XU ≥ 32
• For Strategy 3, the expected revenue function can be written as:
ΠMY 3 =
1
XU
[
pXU − p− pS2− 2p −
pS
2− 2pS
]
where XU(1− p) ≥ 1
We solve the unconstrained problem first. FOC give us (the constant is ignored):
∂ΠMY 3
∂p
= XU − 1− pS2(1− p)2 = 0
∂ΠMY 3
∂pS
= 12− 2p −
1
2(1− pS)2 = 0
The optimal price set is (pS, p) =
(
1− 13√2XU , 1−
1
3
√
(2XU )2
)
for the unconstrained
problem (the objective function is concave as its Hessian is negative definite).
We have two possibilities:
⇒ The constraint is satisfied when XU ≥ 4; therefore, the optimal price set for
the unconstrained problem is the optimal price set for the constrained problem
in this range.
⇒ The constraint is violated when XU < 4. Because of the concavity of the
expected revenue function, XU(1−p) = 1 must be binding. Since the constraint
is not a function of pS, we can show (through Lagrange method) that 12−2p −
1
2(1−pS)2 = 0 must be satisfied. Therefore, pS =
√
XU−1√
XU
and p = XU−1
XU
.
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For Strategy 3, the optimal price set and resulting expected revenue for different
XU values are as follows:
(pS, p) =

(√
XU−1√
XU
, XU−1
XU
)
if XU ≤ 4(
1− 13√2XU , 1−
1
3
√
(2XU )2
)
if XU ≥ 4
ΠMY 3 =

√
XU−1√
XU
if XU ≤ 4
1− 33√(2XU )2 +
1
XU
if XU ≥ 4
• We have found two boundary points so far: XU = 32 and XU = 4. Our expected
revenue function for Strategy 2 was as follows:
ΠMY 2 =
1/(1−pS)∫
0
R1
XU
dx+
XU∫
1/(1−pS)
R2
XU
dx
where XU(1− pS) ≥ 1 and XU(1− p) ≤ 1
1) When XU ≥ 32 , the optimal price set of Strategy 1 is an asymptotically
feasible price set for Strategy 2 since the constraint XU(1− pS) = 1 is binding.
2) When XU ≤ 4, the optimal price set of Strategy 3 is an asymptotically
feasible price set for Strategy 2 since the constraint XU(1− p) = 1 is binding.
By definition, the optimal price set under Strategy 2 is the one with the max-
imum expected revenue of all feasible price sets. Thus, Strategy 2 cannot be
worse than Strategies 1 and 3 in the range of 1.5 ≤XU≤ 4.
After noting these, the expected revenue function can be written as:
ΠMY 2 =
1
XU
[
pSXU +
X2U
2 (pSp− pS + p− p
2)− pS2− 2pS
]
We solve the unconstrained problem first. FOC give us:
∂ΠMY 2
∂p
= XU(pS + 1− 2p) = 0 ∂ΠMY 2
∂pS
= 1− XU(1− p)2 −
1
2XU(1− pS)2 = 0
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The optimal price set must satisfy:
p = ps + 12 and pS = 1−
4
XU
+ 2
X2U(1− pS)2
We discard the solutions violating 0 ≤ pS ≤ p ≤ 1. Our analysis shows that
the optimal price set for the unconstrained problem violates XU(1 − pS) ≥ 1
and XU(1− p) ≤ 1 when XU < 32 and XU > 4. Moreover, XU(1− pS) = 1 must
be binding for XU < 32 ; therefore, pS =
XU−1
XU
. Through Lagrange method, we
know that ∂ΠMY 2
∂p
= 0 must be satisfied in this scenario. Therefore p = 2XU−12XU .
With the same approach, XU(1−p) = 1 must be binding for XU > 4; therefore,
p = XU−1
XU
. Through Lagrange method, we know that ∂ΠMY 2
∂pS
= 0 must be
satisfied in this scenario. Therefore, pS =
√
XU−1√
XU
.
For Strategy 2, the optimal price set and resulting expected revenue for different
XU values are as follows:
(pS, p) =

(
XU−1
XU
, 2XU−12XU
)
if XU ≤ 32(
3XU−4
3XU −
8(1−i√3)
3κ − κ(1+i
√
3)
6X2U
,
3XU−2
3XU −
4(1−i√3)
3κ − κ(1+i
√
3)
12X2U
) if 32 < XU < 4(√
XU−1√
XU
, XU−1
XU
)
if XU ≥ 4
where κ = 3
√
27X4U − 64X3U + 3
√
3
√
27X8U − 128X7U .
Let κ = a+ ib, and its complex conjugate κ¯ = a− ib. Our analysis shows that
κκ¯ = 16X2U when 32 ≤ XU ≤ 4. Multiplying the second term of pS in the second
row with κ¯ gives pS = 3XU−43XU −
κ¯(1−i√3)
6X2U
− κ(1+i
√
3)
6X2U
. The complex parts of the
second and third terms cancel out and we have pS = 3XU−43XU − 2b
√
3−2a
6X2U
. Using
the same iterations for p, we can show that p = 3XU−23XU − b
√
3−a
6X2U
. In order to
make it easier to follow, we use Υ = b
√
3−a
6X2U
.
Based on the prices given above, the resulting expected revenue for different
XU values are as follows:
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ΠMY 2 =

4XU−3
8XU if XU ≤ 32
9XU (6Υ(XU (Υ(XUΥ−2)+2)−3)+5)−44
36XU (3XUΥ+2) if
3
2 ≤ XU ≤ 4
√
XU−1√
XU
if XU ≥ 4
We compare ΠMY 1, ΠMY 2 and ΠMY 3 for a given XU , which leads to Eq (3) and Eq
(4).
Derivation of Eq.(5):
In this proof, we derive the optimal price and expected revenues for the no-standby
case for a given XU .
Two possible strategies exist based on XU values: XU(1− p) ≤ 1 and XU(1− p) ≥ 1
• For Strategy 1, the expected revenue function can be written as:
ΠNS1 =
XU∫
0
x(1− p)p
XU
dx = XU2 p(1− p) where XU(1− p) ≤ 1
We solve the unconstrained problem first. FOC give us (the constant is ignored)
∂ΠNS1
∂p
= 1− 2p = 0.
Using a similar approach as in Strategy 1 of the myopic case gives:
p =

1
2 if XU ≤ 2
XU−1
XU
if XU ≥ 2
ΠNS1 =

XU
8 if XU ≤ 2
XU−1
2XU if XU ≥ 2
• For Strategy 2, the expected revenue function can be written as:
ΠNS2 =
1/(1−p)∫
0
x(1− p)p
XU
dx+
XU∫
1/(1−p)
p
XU
dx = 1
XU
(pXU − p2− 2p)
where XU(1− p) ≥ 1
We solve the unconstrained problem first. FOC give ∂ΠNS2
∂p
= XU − 12(1−p)2 = 0.
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Using a similar approach as in Strategy 3 of the base model gives:
p =

XU−1
XU
if XU ≤ 2
√
2XU−1√
2XU
if XU ≥ 2
ΠNS2 =

XU−1
2XU if XU ≤ 2
1− 2√2XU +
1
2XU if XU ≥ 2
We compare ΠNS1 and ΠNS2 for a given XU and choose the optimal price, leading us
to Eq (5).
Proof of Proposition 1:
Comparison of the expected revenue functions and optimal price sets in Eq (3), Eq
(4) and Eq (5) leads to ΠMY > ΠNS and pMYS < pNS < pMY .
Derivation of the Model Extension for Overbooking:
With the new booking constraint on the premium rooms, there are four different sets
of possible outcomes (instead of the three in the base model) for a given price set
(pS, p) and a realized market size x: In OW1 , the hotel can fully satisfy the premium
room and standby upgrade demand (DP ≤ 1 − w and DS + DP ≤ 1). In OW2 , the
hotel can fully satisfy the premium room demand (DP ≤ 1 − w), but can only par-
tially satisfy the standby upgrade demand (DS + DP > 1). In OW3 , the premium
room demand exceeds the new booking constraint (DP > 1 − w), but the standby
upgrade demand is fully satisfied (DS ≤ w). In OW4 , the premium room demand ex-
ceeds the booking constraint and the hotel can only partially satisfy standby upgrade
demand (DS > w).1 Using a similar approach as in the base model, we can write the
premium room capacity allocated to premium room bookings and standby upgrades,
and resulting revenue as follows:
1Note that as w → 0, OW4 converges to O3 in our base model with (CP , CS) = (1, 0).
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Outcome (CP , CS) Revenue
OW1 (DP , DS) RW1 = (x(1− p))p+ (x(p− pS))pS
OW2 (DP , 1−DP ) RW2 = (x(1− p))p+ (1− x(1− p))pS
OW3 (1− w,DS) RW3 = (1− w)p+ (x(p− pS))pS
OW4 (1− w,w) RW4 = (1− w)p+ wpS
Note that no strategy can lead to both OW2 and OW3 for the given conditions. There-
fore, we can show that five possible strategies exist:
Strategy 1: Choosing a price set (pS, p) leading to an outcome set {OW1 } where the
hotel’s expected revenue is ΠW1 =
∫XU
0
RW1
XU
dx.
Strategy 2: Choosing a price set (pS, p) leading to an outcome set {OW1 , OW2 } where
the hotel’s expected revenue is ΠW2 =
∫ 1/(1−pS)
0
RW1
XU
dx+
∫XU
1/(1−pS)
RW2
XU
dx.
Strategy 3: Choosing a price set (pS, p) leading to an outcome set {OW1 , OW3 } where
the hotel’s expected revenue is ΠW3 =
∫ (1−w)/(1−p)
0
RW1
XU
dx+
∫XU
(1−w)/(1−p)
RW3
XU
dx.
Strategy 4: Choosing a price set (pS, p) leading to an outcome set {OW1 , OW3 , OW4 }
where the hotel’s expected revenue is ΠW4 =
∫ (1−w)/(1−p)
0
RW1
XU
dx+
∫ w/(p−pS)
(1−w)/(1−p)
RW3
XU
dx+∫XU
w/(w−pS)
RW4
XU
dx.
Strategy 5: Choosing a price set (pS, p) leading to an outcome set {OW1 , OW2 , OW4 }
where the hotel’s expected revenue is ΠW5 =
∫ 1/(1−pS)
0
RW1
XU
dx +
∫ (1−w)/(1−p)
1/(1−pS)
RW2
XU
dx +∫XU
(1−w)/(1−p)
RW4
XU
dx.
The following lemma presents the optimal strategies for a given set of XU and w.
Lemma: When the hotel allocates w ∈ [0, 0.5] of its premium room capacity to satisfy
the excess standard room demand and utilizes standby upgrades, the hotel should
follow Strategy 1 whenXU ≤ L(w) = 32 , Strategy 5 forXU ≥ H(w) = 4(1+w)(1−w)2,
and Strategy 2 otherwise. (see Figure B.1 for L(w) and H(w)).
Proof of Lemma 4:
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Figure B.1 Bounds of the Optimal Strategies for
Different w and XU values
For Strategy 1, the expected revenue function can be written as:
ΠW1 =
XU
2 [pSp− p
2
S + p− p2] where XU(1− pS) ≤ 1 and XU(1− p) ≤ 1− w
Note that this function is identical to ΠMY 1 in Lemma 1. Therefore, the optimal
price set is (pS, p) = (13 ,
2
3) for the unconstrained problem. The constraints can be
rewritten as XU ≤ 3(1 − w) and XU ≤ 32 . Since we only consider w ∈ [0, 0.5],
the optimal price set for the unconstrained problem is the optimal price set for the
constrained problem only if XU ≤ 32 . Parallel to Lemma 1, Strategy 1 is the optimal
strategy for the maximization problem only when XU ≤ 32 . Let L(w) = 32 denote the
upper bound of XU for Strategy 1.
For Strategy 5, the expected revenue function can be written as:
ΠW5 =
−2p2(1− pS − 1)(1− w)XU + p (2p2SwXU + pS((w − 2)w − 2XU + 2))
2(1− p)(1− pS)XU
−(w − 1)(w + 2XU − 1) + pS (pS (2wXU + (1− w)
2) + w(w + 2XU − 2))
2(1− p)(1− pS)XU
where XU(1− p) ≥ 1− w and XU(p− pS) ≥ w
FOC give us (the constant is ignored):
∂ΠW5
∂p
= (pS − 1)(1− w)
2
2(1− p)2XU − w + 1 = 0
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∂ΠW5
∂pS
= p (2(1− pS)
2wXU − 1) + p2S (− (2wXU + (1− w)2))
2(p− 1)(1− pS)2XU
+2pS (2wXU + (1− w)
2)− w(w + 2XU − 2)
2(p− 1)(1− pS)2XU = 0
Note that Strategy 3 in Lemma 1 is a special case of Strategy 5 when w = 0. Using
a similar approach as in Lemma 1, the constraints are satisfied when XU is greater
than some lower bound H(w) for the optimal price set for the unconstrained problem.
Similarly, the constraint XU(1−p) = 1−w must be binding for XU ≤ H(w). Solving
the binding constraint and FOC gives us H(w) = 4(1 + w)(1 − w)2. Parallel to
Lemma 1, Strategy 5 is the optimal strategy for the maximization problem only
when XU ≥ 4(1 + w)(1 − w)2. The proof on the suboptimality of Strategy 3 and
Strategy 4 when w ≤ 0.5 is available from authors upon request.
Proof of Proposition 2:
For the first part of the proposition, it is easy to see ΠW1 = ΠMY 1 and ΠW2 = ΠMY 2.
The optimal price sets are identical for the two unconstrained problems with the same
objective function. Following the lemma above, p(w) = pMY and pS(w) = pMYS when
XU ≤ H(w) (when Strategy 1 or 2 is optimal). Given XU(1 − p) ≤ 1 − w is not
violated, CP and CS are the same for both problems resulting in no change in the
expected revenues.
The proof of the price comparisons in the second part of the proposition is straight-
forward but lengthy, therefore available from the authors upon request. For the
expected revenue comparisons, let Π(pS, p, w) denote the expected revenue of a price
set (pS, p) for a given w. Consider a hotel using a price set
(
p∗S(w),p∗(w)
)
which is
optimal for a given XU and w when Strategy 5 is used. When O1 or O2 is observed,
CP and CS do not change in w. On the other hand, recall that (CP , CS) = (1−w,w)
when O4 is observed. In this outcome, CP decreases in w while CS increases. Given
p > pS and RW4 = (1 − w)p + wpS, Π
(
p∗S(w), p∗(w), w
)
< Π
(
p∗S(w), p∗(w), w − ∆
)
where ∆ is a very small positive number. Since we have Π
(
p∗S(w), p∗(w), w −∆
)
≤
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Π
(
p∗S(w−∆), p∗(w−∆), w−∆
)
given that the latter is the optimal expected revenue
for θ + ∆, we can deduce Π
(
p∗S(w), p∗(w), w
)
< Π
(
p∗S(w − ∆), p∗(w − ∆), w − ∆
)
.
Thus, we conclude that Π(w) decreases in w.
Proof of Lemma 3:
In this proof, we show the optimal strategy for strategic guests for a given XU .
For each XU value, we have three candidate pricing strategies for the optimal price
set. These strategies have different expected revenue functions and constraints.
• For Strategy 1 where XU(1− pS) ≤ 1, the expected revenue function is ΠST1 =∫XU
0
R1
XU
dx.
Since premium room bookings and standby upgrade demand are fully satisfied
in this strategy, r′ = 1 (v∗ = ∞) and z = 1. Therefore, R1 simplifies to
(x(1− pS))pS, and ΠST1 = ΠNS1.
• For Strategy 2 where XU(1− pS) > 1 and XU(1− z) ≤ 1, the expected revenue
function is:
ΠST2 =
1/(1−pS)∫
0
R1
XU
dx+
XU∫
1/(1−pS)
R2
XU
dx
There are two cases:
– r′ ≥ 1−p1−pS . This results in z = 1 and the following constraint holds:
(1− p) ≤ (1− pS)
 1/(1−pS)∫
0
1
XU
dx+
XU∫
1/(1−pS)
1
x(1− pS)
1
XU
dx)

In this case, R1 simplifies to (x(1−pS))pS and R2 simplifies to pS, therefore
ΠST2a = ΠNS2.
– r′ < 1−p1−pS . This results in z < 1 and the following constraint holds:
(z − p) = (z − pS)
 1/(1−pS)∫
0
1
XU
dx+
XU∫
1/(1−pS)
1− x(1− z)
x(z − pS)
1
XU
dx

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Note that the constraint can be simplified to XU(1− p) = 1 + log(XU(1−
pS)). Through this constraint and the condition XU(1 − pS) > 1 , we
get p < XU−1
XU
and pS < XU−1XU . Since z disappears from the constraint,
the equilibrium is not unique. However, the smallest possible z results in
the highest expected revenue, as it implies that more people will directly
book the premium rooms. Given pS < XU−1XU , the expected revenue for
a given price set (pS, p) reaches its upper bound at z = XU−1XU (i.e. the
XU(1− z) ≤ 1 constraint is binding).
• For Strategy 3 where XU(1− z) > 1, the expected revenue function is:
ΠST3 =
1/(1−pS)∫
0
R1
XU
dx+
1/(1−z)∫
1/(1−pS)
R2
XU
dx+
XU∫
1/(1−z)
R3
XU
dx
The following constraint holds:
(z − p) = (z − pS))
 1/(1−pS)∫
0
1
XU
dx+
1/(1−z)∫
1/(1−pS)
1− x(1− z)
x(z − pS)
1
XU
dx)

which can be simplified to XU(z − p) = log
(
1−pS
1−z
)
.
Let ΠST3(pS, p, z) and ΠST2b(pS, p, z) denote the expected revenues of a price set
(pS, p) and a z value satisfying the constraints of Strategy 3 and the second case
of Strategy 2, respectively. For a given XU , the upper bound for ΠST2b(pS, p, z) is
ΠST2b
(
p∗S, p
∗, XU−1
XU
)
where (p∗S, p∗) is the optimal price set of the second scenario of
Strategy 2. The set (p∗S, p∗, z) asymptotically satisfies the constraints of Strategy
3, therefore ΠST3
(
p∗S, p
∗, XU−1
XU
)
= ΠST2b
(
p∗S, p
∗, XU−1
XU
)
. Given ΠST3
(
p∗S, p
∗, XU−1
XU
)
≤
ΠST3(p∗∗S , p∗∗, z∗∗) where the left-hand side is the expected revenue of a feasible price
set under Strategy 3 while the right-hand-side is the optimal expected revenue under
Strategy 3, ΠST2b ≤ ΠST3. Thus, Strategy 2 is weakly dominated by Strategy 3, and
we ignore Strategy 2 from further consideration.
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Now, we can compare Strategy 1, the first scenario of Strategy 2 and Strategy 3 under
two cases of XU :
• XU ≤ 2: In this range, ΠNS2 ≤ ΠNS1; therefore, Strategy 1 (with the optimal
pS = XU−1XU ) dominates the first scenario of Strategy 2. Consider a hotel trying
to implement Strategy 3. Given a low XU and its resulting high r′ values in
this range, the asymptotic upper bound of the expected revenue under Strategy
3 is the expected revenue under (p, pS, z) =
(
XU−1
XU
, XU−1
XU
, XU−1
XU
)
, which is also
the optimal expected revenue under Strategy 2. Therefore, Strategy 1 is the
optimal strategy in this range.
• XU > 2: In this range, ΠNS2 > ΠNS1; therefore, the first scenario of Strategy
2 (with an optimal pS =
√
2XU−1√
2XU
) dominates Strategy 1. Consider a hotel that
chooses a price set
(√
2XU−1√
2XU
,
√
2XU−1√
2XU
+ ∆
)
, where ∆ is a very small positive
number. In this case, we can have z < 1, i.e., some of the guests with v >
√
2XU−1√
2XU
+ ∆ book a premium room, therefore ΠNS2 < ΠST3
(√
2XU−1√
2XU
,
√
2XU−1√
2XU
+
∆, z
)
. Given ΠST3
(√
2XU−1√
2XU
,
√
2XU−1√
2XU
+ ∆, z
)
≤ ΠST3(p∗∗S , p∗∗, z∗∗) where the
left-hand side is the expected revenue of a feasible price set under Strategy 3
while the right-hand-side is the optimal expected revenue under Strategy 3,
ΠNS2 < ΠST3(p∗∗S , p∗∗, z∗∗). Thus, Strategy 3 is the optimal strategy in this
range.
Proof of Proposition 3:
In this proof, we compare the expected revenues of the strategic case with the no-
standby benchmark and the myopic case for a given XU .
Let Π˜(pS, p) denote the expected revenue of the price set (pS, p) when guests are
myopic and Π̂(pS, p) denote the expected revenue of the price set (pS, p) when guests
are strategic.
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• XU ≤ 2: In this case, we know from Lemma 3 that a hotel facing strategic
guests should use Strategy 1, i.e., a price set where all guests choose standby
upgrades, and ΠST1 = ΠNS1. Given ΠNS < Π˜(pMYS , pMY ), we deduce ΠST1 <
Π˜(pMYS , pMY ).
• XU > 2: In this case, we know from Lemma 3 that the hotel’s optimal strategy
is to choose a price set that leads to z < 1. We make two comparisons for this
range of XU values:
⇒ Comparison of ΠST and ΠNS: Given z < 1, standby upgrade program price
discriminates. Consider a hotel facing strategic guests that uses a standby
upgrade program and chooses a price set (pNS, pNS + ∆) where ∆ is a very
small positive number. Π̂(pNS, pNS + ∆) > ΠNS, since some of the guests with
v > pNS + ∆ book a premium room. Given Π̂(pNS, pNS + ∆) ≤ Π̂(pSTS , pST ),
we find Π̂(pSTS , pST ) > ΠNS.
⇒ Comparison of ΠST and ΠMY : Consider a hotel using the optimal price set
for the strategic case, i.e., (pSTS , pST ). Given 1 − z < 1 − pST , the number of
premium room bookings when guests are myopic is greater than the number of
premium room bookings when guests are strategic. Therefore, Π̂(pSTS , pST ) <
Π˜(pSTS , pST ). Since Π˜(pSTS , pST ) ≤ Π˜(pMYS , pMY ) as the latter is the optimal
profit for the strategic customer case, we find Π˜(pMYS , pMY ) > Π̂(pSTS , pST ).
Proof of Proposition 4:
In this proof, we show that strategic guests never book premium rooms if the hotel
uses the optimal price set in the myopic case for a given XU . Let us evaluate XU ≤ 1.5
and XU > 1.5 separately:
• XU ≤ 1.5: In this case, the hotel uses Strategy 1, i.e., fully satisfies the premium
room and standby upgrade demand. Therefore, r′ = r = 1 and all strategic
guests choose standby upgrades.
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• XU > 1.5: In this case, the hotel uses Strategy 2 or Strategy 3. For a given
XU , we need to show that the price set (pMYS , pMY ) always leads to z = 1. In
order to show this, we test whether the utility of choosing a standby upgrade
dominates booking a premium room for all guests. For a given (pMYS , pMY , XU)
set, the following inequality always holds:
(1− pMY ) ≤ (1− pMYS )
 1/(1−pMYS )∫
0
1
XU
dx+
XU∫
1/(1−pMYS )
1
XU(1− pMYS )x
dx

where the left-hand side of the inequality is the utility of booking a premium
room for a guest with v = 1 and the right hand side of the inequality is the utility
of choosing a standby upgrade for a guest with v = 1 times her expectation on
the fill rate. Given that this inequality always holds, even a guest with v = 1
would choose the standby upgrade offer. Therefore, standby upgrades fully
cannibalize the premium room bookings.
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Appendix C
Supplement for Chapter 4
Information About Other Sports Leagues/Tournaments:
NFL Super Bowl:
Tournament structure: 32 teams compete in two conferences during the regular season
and top six from each conference make it to playoffs (single-game knockout) and get
match-ups based on their standings. In last 10 years (including 2017), No.1 seeds in
each conference played in Super Bowl only 11 times.
Ticket allocation and resale market: For Super Bowl, NFL makes a pre-season lottery
to send out 1000 tickets to public from the face value, which winners are not allowed
to pick up their tickets until the game day, and only after they already have entered
the game site. In addition, NFL gives selling rights of more than 5000 packages (9000
for Super Bowl 2018) to On Location Experiences. The company sells packages in
two ways: (i) Standard packages where the customer is confirmed immediately, (ii)
conditional packages where the customer reserves a package and has to buy only if
his/her team advances to final (for last 8 teams). The resale market is not controlled,
therefore tickets in this market may get extremely expensive.
FIFA World Cup:
Tournament structure: 32 teams (coming from different zonal qualifications) compete
in eight groups and then top two from each group make it to playoffs (single-game
knockout). There is no official standing or ranking system, the playoff bracket is
announced before the tournament and matchups are based on the group standing.
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Ticket allocation and resale market: For World Cup, because of the size of the tour-
nament, FIFA sells a lot of different types of tickets. Therefore, one can get into the
final match through different channels: (i) Buying an individual match ticket, (ii)
buying venue-specific match tickets for the stadium of the final, (iii) buying a regular
team-specific ticket for all rounds 1, and (iv) buying optional team-specific tickets for
all rounds where the customer basically reserves a ticket and has to pay for the ticket
only if his/her team advances to final. When the demand exceeds the supply for a
game, FIFA uses a random drawing procedure where priority is given to advanced
reservations. Note that FIFA does not allow customers to resell tickets from a dif-
ferent price than face value, but provides a channel for resale. FIFA also allocates a
significant number of its capacity to MATCH Hospitality to sell hospitality packages
for the whole tournament or individual games.
NCAA Men’s Basketball:
Tournament structure: Teams play a regular season where 68 teams make it to play-
offs (single-game knockout), where 32 Division I conference champions receive an
automatic bid. Rest of the teams are decided by selection committee which also de-
cides on the seeding. There are several polls announced weekly for top-25 teams (e.g.
AP Poll, Coaches Poll) which give fans an idea about their team’s strength. Note that
Selection Committee gave a preview of top-16 seeds a month before the official an-
nouncement of their decision, first time in 2017. Last 10 years (up to 2016) show that
only 17 of Preseason Top-4 ranked teams make it to the Final-Four. Interestingly,
this number is only 16 for four No. 1 seeds of the playoffs.2
Ticket allocation and resale market: The College Basketball use a similar structure
to the College Football where there is a pre-season lottery and a significant number
1This ticket guarantees the customer tickets for each round of the tournament, regardless of
whether the team itself qualifies.
227 of Preseason Top-10 ranked teams make it to the Final-Four. This number is 25 for No.1
and No.2 seeds of the playoffs.
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of tickets are given to hospitality rights holders, PrimeSport. It also has an official
channel for resale, where customers can resell tickets from any price.
Alabama’s Regular Season Snapshot:
Figure C.1 displays Alabama’s weekly bid, offer, and transaction volumes in the 2015
season with the weekly performance.
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Figure C.1 Alabama in the 2015 Regular Season
Blue tracker displays Alabama’s weekly ranking. Big and small green arrows represent
important wins, versus Top-10 and Top-25 ranked teams respectively. Red arrow
represents a loss.
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